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My thesis is that law scholarship, lacking any unifying sense of
place and purpose, is fragmented and drifting. Not, obviously, that
there should be a single mold. But we might at least compass ourselves
by a firmer and perhaps more modest sense of our own specialness in
the intellectual and social order. Much of the work we have sidled
into can be done as well, if not better, by sociologists, economists,
political scientists, and many others-often lawyers, playwrights, or
judges. When I ask myself what we have to contribute that is unique
-unique even in joint effort with others-the tasks I return to all
have, at their basis, our special familiarity with the legal language.
The language point of view provides a conception through which
we can integrate the three overlapping roles that law academics play,
of teacher, of commentator, and of participant in the law-creation
process.1 What the law is, is a language activity. A just appreciation
of this fact offers a fresh perspective on some of the most fundamental
issues legal scholarship has traditionally probed. Even among those
who would not characterize their work as about language, the language
framework helps locate our common bonds, our points of contact
with each other, with those in allied fields, and with society.
t Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law, University of Southern California.
Those beyond blame for the last words, but to be thanked for some early ones, include
Steve Barkan, Scott Bice, John Borgo, Orrin Evans, Ron Garet, Barbara Herman, Charles
Kennel, Martin Levine, Michael Moore, Jill Mubarak, Judi Resnik, Ken Russak, Edwin
Smith, Joel Shor, Robert Thompson, Dallas Willard, and my commentators, Ellen Peters
and Martin Shapiro.
I. As teachers of law, it is a set of language skills that we teach. See pp. 1157-59 infra
(examining law as a language activity). As theoreticians on law, it is the characteristics
of the law-language as a medium that we examine. See pp. 1159-73 infra (relating tradi-
tional problems of legal theory to characteristics of law as a language medium). And as
participants in the lawmaking process, it is a linguistic activity to which we are con-
tributing. See pp. 1173-92 infra (relating scholarship's role in law-creation to legal
language).
The distinction is roughly that between teaching physics, commenting on physics as a
metalevel activity in the philosophy of science, and participating in scientific investi-
gations in physics. The roles, particularly the last two, may readily conflate. Would one
consider Albert Einstein and Neils Bohr, for example, as commenting on physics from
without or contributing to its development from within? Though conflation may some-
times be useful, separating the roles, with their slightly different emphases, serves to
clarify the present paper.
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I
In the fall of 1959, when I entered the Yale Law School, the most
eminent scholars were predominantly treatise writers: Bogart, Casner,
Corbin, J.W. Moore, Pound, Powell, Prosser, Scott, Williston, and
many others.2 I should not have to add that all these men were larger
than their treatises. But whatever they turned their hands to, it was
on the credit of their treatises that their words were somehow backed,
and they benefited by a sort of rubbed-off reverence for Cooley, Gray,
Greenleaf, Kent, Maitland, Mechem, Pollock, Pomeroy, Steffen, Story,
Thayer, and Wigmore, whose tradition was in their keep.
The ascendance of the treatise has to be understood against the
background of legal education. Legal education did not simply grow
out of universities; it was grafted onto them. The law schools retain
a heritage, a mission, and a host of institutional conceits, such as
"thinking like a lawyer," that imply a lingering separation from the
rest of the university, with consequent uncertainty as to the place of
scholarship. 3
The treatise emerged as the law school's compromise. At its most
commonplace, treatise writing represented an earnest and industrious
attempt to accommodate the expectations both of university and of pro-
fession. At its best, the scholarship was-in compass, subtlety, rigor,
and imagination-nothing for other university departments to sniff
at. The respect was displayed in the hush with which we tributed
Corbin, then nearing ninety, when he materialized in the law library
to cull the advance sheets, as best he could with his portable lamp
and dying eyes. Men such as Corbin were, in the law at least, the
embodiment of scholarship.
Not so today. Treatises, some of them splendid,4 are still being
written, but the prestige of the undertaking has tarnished.5 In the
fifteen years I have been interviewing prospective law teachers, prompt-
ing them in overheated hotel lobbies to describe their idealized ca-
reers, I cannot recall any who fancied doing a treatise. Indeed, it is
my impression that few today aspire to the mastery of any body of
2. Ellen Peters has called to my attention the fact-generally unappreciated by my
classmates-that Corbin did not undertake his well-known treatise until after "retirement."
3. See Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN
AMERICAN HisToRY: LAW IN AMERICAN HisroRY 538 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971)
(because law schools are primarily professional schools, teaching takes pride of place
over scholarship).
4. Boris Bittker's just-published treatise on federal tax law is a sterling example. B.
Bn-Rm, FEDERAL TAXATION Or INCOME, EsrATES, AND GiFTs (1981).
5. See Horwitz, Special Sources of American Legal History: Part II-Treatise Litera-
ture, 69 LAw LiB. J. 460, 460 (1976).
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law in particular. The brightest of the candidates, though typically
"willing to 'do' torts," have as their principal interest some body of
scholarship outside the law. They have discovered in, say, economics
or social-choice theory, some lance of insight with which they are
prepared to take a tilt at the law-any body of legal rules should do-
in some way it has not been tilted at before.
What accounts for the lost luster of treatise-writing as a principal,
if not the principal, outlet for scholarly ambitions? There are only
partial explanations. Each part, however, contributes to a fuller un-
derstanding of the concerns about purpose and direction that have
led to this symposium.
Probably the most significant way to regard the treatise's demise is
to count it among Mark Tushnet's "legacies of realism."8 The aspira-
tion that drove the traditional treatise-to locate the quintessential
legal rules and principles-was, at the least, deflated by the realist
attack.
Part of the explanation lies, too, in contemporary temperament. To
do a treatise well and to keep it current involves fastening to a single,
more or less foreseeable set of problems for a professional lifetime,
a commitment not suited to the generalist self-image of those attract-
ed to law teaching.7 Treatise-writing is discouraged, too, by the fact
that much of the most challenging, creative, and rewarding work
that the enterprise once entailed-the supplying of insight and system
-has largely been done in the major common-law fields." The po-
tential influence of treatises has also declined. In an era when the
courts were guarded about their capacity to "make law," the treatise
was a vehicle for subtle and diplomatic advocacy, often under the
6. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208-09 (1981);
see Horwitz, supra note 5, at 460. Arthur Leff has presented much the same thesis in
his own inimitable style. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nom-
inalism, 60 VA. L. REv. 451 (1974).
7. From discussions I have had with scholars from other fields, however, I suspect
that the demise of the treatise is connected with something that is more endemic and
revealing. It may be that, in all fields of endeavor, the real world, which has always
been regarded by scholars with some detachment if not disfavor, has become so over-
whelmingly beyond comprehension that scholars generally have abandoned trying to ac-
count for what is happening out there in favor, as the most they can hope for, of an
account of what is happening among themselves.
There may be, as an independent disincentive to the continuation of the treatise in
law, the fact that the sheer burden of "keeping up" has increased dramatically with the
increased volume of reported cases. Yet improved data-systems such as LEXIS may offset
the burden of the increased volume.
8. This is not to deny that new, broader conceptions of the treatise may continue the
search for insight and system through alliance with other fields. See R. PosNEa, Eco-
NomIc ANALYSTS oF LAw (2d ed. 1977).
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guise of saying what the law was.9 Gray made perpetuities. 10 But to-
day's scholars can employ journal articles quite as effectively, par-
ticularly considering the more frank environment about judicial law-
making power. Moreover, the new fields, such as environmental law,
are increasingly legislated, and old fields are being codified. Those
who itch to influence the course of law can testify before legislatures
or serve on Restatement committees.
We have to account, too, for the many specialized reporter services,
such as those provided by the Bureau of National Affairs and Com-
merce Clearing House,- and the ever-improving library support ser-
vices, often computer-aided, such as those of LEXIS and WESTLAW.
Obviously, although the new generation of services and technologies
cannot by themselves displace treatises, their existence may slightly
demean the undertaking.1 Witness, in this regard, how many of the
treatises that remain in print, once under the guiding hand of schol-
ars associated with law schools, have been contracted out for "up-
dating" to practicing members of the bar; in some cases, the effort
to keep current has simply been assumed by publishing houses.12
In summary, our distant predecessors found things within the law
to take pride in, to wonder at, to carry on. Those of my generation
were molded by teachers who found this view of the mission a bit
unchallenging and worn and had a philosophy to justify shifting
9. A flavor of this from a master: "The following well-reasoned opinion shows a correct
way to avoid the fallacy of rejecting an inference upon an inference, and yet to give
effect to the underlying distrust of inferences which rest upon too many intervening in.
ferences ... ." I J. WIet'MoRE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 41, at 438 (3d ed. 1940).
10. Gray's influence was such that even after the publication of 4 RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY (1944), his views, and not those of the Restatement, continued to dominate in
the courts. See 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 24.1, at 8 n.4 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
11. Of course, there never was any required "sonnet" form for the treatise. Perhaps
one effect of the new technology is to alter the form of treatise-type undertakings, further
substituting theoretical analysis for synopsis and completeness to account for the readier
availability of reported opinions to a broader population of users.
12. For example, W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(rev. ed.), is now in the hands of members of the bar and of the publishers' editorial staff,
as is W. BowE & D. PACKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS (1960). The attorney who is
keeping up G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d rev. ed.
1965), appears to be a son, George Taylor Bogert, of George G. Bogert, who wrote the
first edition, G. BoGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (1935). Not all the academics
have bowed out, of course. Professor Tribe has stepped in with L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1978), and James H. Chadbourn is revising J. WMoRE, sUpra
note 9. Professor Scott was keeping up A. SCOTT, THE LAw OF TRUSTS (3d ed. 1967) until
shortly before his death this spring.
It is interesting that Corwin on the Constitution, one of the most eminent treatises
that had been in the custody of a non-law-school faculty member, is being maintained
in its 14th edition by Harold W. Chase and Craig R. Ducat, both, like Corwin, associated
with political science faculties. See H. CHASE & C. DuCAT, EDwARD S. CORWIN'S THE CON-
STITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (14th ed. 1978).
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their attention to other, more glamorous chores. They launched us
along the path of what might be called Late Realism. If the principles
of the treatise writers, even the principles of the realist writers such
as Corbin, fell short of providing an adequate accounting and justi-
fication of law, then "our" task was to press on to discover the prin-
ciples on some yet "higher" level-in a theory of the state, or of social
choice, or of morality. Yet, as Paul Brest's paper evidences,13 there
is a gTowing sense in our community that this path only winds up
in its own contradictions and muddles. And so we are left to recon-
sider, once more, what we are all about.
II
In view of the emphasis law schools place on teaching, the writing
of teaching materials is more esteemed in legal scholarship than it is
in other disciplines. But neither the energies devoted to, nor the
laurels won by, the casebooks have expanded to replace treatise-writing.
The content of even the most ambitious casebooks is too much
someone else's. The dominant forms of scholarly expression have
therefore become journal articles and books, in which those who
feel they have something to say can say it less obliquely.
Current scholarship obviously has a breadth, richness, and volume
that defy any summary judgment. If I had to offer one broad gener-
alization, I would call it overwhelmingly risk averse: clarity and not-
being-wrong dominate imagination. That misgiving aside, my prin-
cipal concern here is not so much with the quality of the work as
with the character and aim of the scholarly activity behind it.14
13. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
14. A variety of inquiries might add perspective on our activities, some of which
would benefit from the assistance of experts, such as sociologists conscripted from "out-
side." One model is Robert Merton's study of the sociology of science. R. MERTON, THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1973). A sociologist of law scholarship might inquire, for a starter,
whether any practicing lawyer attended this symposium, and whether anyone who did,
cared. Which, and how many, lawyers, judges, and newspaper editors read which of the
law journals or other scholarship that is coming out of the law schools, and for what
purposes? Who is reading and writing the law scholarship that is more closely associated
with practitioners-that in Trial Magazine, the state bar journals, The Business Lawyer,
and Case and Comment? Conversely, where do the people who are writing the law schol-
arship on each of these various levels get their information?
These questions concern what has been called "the invisible college," the informal and
extra-institutional pathways that link disparate influences and shape the course of in-
tellectual development in any discipline. See D. CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLWES 49-56 (1972).
Learning more about how these connections are organized, and perhaps most important,
how the scholarly agendas are set in law, would be a worthy aim of a scholarship of
law scholarship. Until we have a better feel for what other relationships exist in other
fields, we are limited in any discUssion of whether what we have is what we want.
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We can divide this activity serviceably, if roughly, into three levels.
The base level, commanding the bulk of the energy, aims at conven-
tional intellectual housekeeping: summarizing, unveiling common
underlying elements, smoothing over apparent inconsistencies and
propounding advances and retreats, usually within modest bounds.
Periodically the scene is livened by activity on a second level, a vogue,
in which a flurry of attention is concentrated on a particular topic
or technique. "Neutral principles," the insanity defense, condemna-
tion, state action, the digesting of Rawls and the Coase Theorem-
all have enjoyed their day and have, to their credit, commanded
widespread, and unifying, interest and contributions. The third level
takes place in what we might call "schools," which have a longer
lifespan than the vogues, enlist a broader membership, and like schools
in any discipline, define themselves by a shared theme or technique.
The predominant organizing bond in legal scholarship has been the
interdisciplinary, co-venturing "law and . . ." enterprise-law and
anthropology, law and economics, law and psychiatry. 15
I do not know enough about the functions of schools in the arts
and sciences generally to be able to say how ours compare with
theirs. Certainly, wherever it takes place, there are some all-too-obvious
hazards to school-work, chiefly the lure of a comfortable insularity.
Isolated by a common tongue, absorbed in their own puzzles, confi-
dent of what problems, methods, and people count, the members of
a school may wind up speaking to no one but themselves.
On the other hand, the very prevalence of intensive, specialized
activity in so many fields is strong evidence of countervailing advan-
tages. The schools in law, with their predominantly interdisciplinary
bias, provide legal scholarship's most significant link to extralegal
intellectual sources. The schools also afford the benefits of commu-
nity, both intellectual and psychological: a pooling and concentration
of insight, effort, and prestige, and a supply of respected colleagues
to provide reassurances of worth. Although this mutual reinforcement
and shelter from broad-based criticism may have its vices, it also has
its virtues: in the life of every idea, there is a critical period for nur-
ture, in which it stands to benefit from a little space safe from punc-
turers and cannibals.16
15. The school may assume a multidisciplinary form, as with one of our most en-
during and internationally influential schools, that of Lasswell and MacDougall. The
newest "school" of significance is probably the Critical Legal Studies group whose mem-
bers are "actively seeking to expose and explain the central social/personal crisis of our
time: the collapse of official rationality" and its implications for legal studies. See D'Errico,
A Critique of 'Critical Social Thought About Law' and Some Comments on Decoding
Capitalist Culture, AM. LEGAL STuD. A. F., June 1979, at 39-40.
16. Although the division into schools increases the risks of retreating from the prob-
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If there is, then, a problem-and there being a symposium, one
presumes that there is-it is not that many of our most creative and
energetic minds have been drawn off into schools, nor even that we
frequently seem to lose sight of society's dilemmas in favor of our
own. Some fragmentation is inevitable. The problem is one of de-
gree: lacking a common sense of endeavor, we have detached into
separate islands of activity, mutually isolated from many potentially
unifying and beneficial dialogues. Some of us are occupied with par-
ticular themes and techniques because they are familiar; others work
with other themes and techniques because they are novel. Our over-
extension is another symptom of drift: lacking a clear sense of "our
own" mission and abilities, we tend to take on problems for which
we are unsuited, often to the neglect of what we can do best. When
we work with nonlawyers, as we surely should, what should we be
looking to contribute? In our internal and external dealings, is the
benefit of one's labors lost on others unnecessarily? Are we exchanging
ideas in all instances where we could produce gains from trade?
I concede that all of these points sound impressionistic and vague.
But it is easy to generate concrete illustrations. For example, one
measure of organization of law scholarly activities is the extent to
which those engaged in gathering data respond to what the theorists
need for the testing of their theories; some coherence would be con-
firmed if the theorizers even read the empiricists' work. Does anyone
really believe, though, that those who do empirical research on the
criminal justice system have a clear idea of what those who are doing
Big Theory Justice are about, or vice versa? Doubtless, the direction
of empirical research in law is most strongly influenced by the avail-
ability of grants, the techniques that are fashionable in social science
research, the kind of research that is technologically feasible, and
what sounds exciting. The data that the rest of law scholarship might
need, or even find useful, do not orient empiricists' thinking. If we
were to ask the same sorts of questions about other intrascholarly re-
lations, would the answers be any different?
To define and approach the same sorts of problems in different
lems that trouble the world to those that seem to trouble only academia, who is to say
that the interests of the larger community are disserved? Even if we assume that Watson
and Crick, in their long hunt for the DNA molecule, subordinated the sight of mankind
to that of prizes and professional triumph, see J. WATsoN, THE DouBrL HELtx 48 (1965)
(goal of Watson and Crick was to "imitate Linus Pauling and beat him at his own
game"), and the satisfactions of puzzle-solving, cf. T. KUHN, THE STRcrUtRE OF SCIENIFIC
REVOLUTiONS 35-38 (2d ed. 1970) (discussing such satisfaction among scientists generally),
the rest of us came off none the worse for it. Perhaps the necessary research was achieved
even more quickly and efficiently than had they been motivated by a desire to promote
some abstract good of mankind.
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ways is a source of vitality. But the fragmentation of effort that sees
so many different techniques being applied to so many different
themes, with so little effort devoted to identifying and developing
what we uniquely have to offer, can produce a disconcerted, however
impressive, babel.
III
In an academic setting, whatever degree of organization and order
it is possible to achieve has to be self-imposed and governed by a
more-or-less shared understanding of what the subject matter is. In-
deed, in almost every discipline, a traditional function of scholarship
was once to keep the "what is ... ?" questions in view: "What is art?"
"What is science?" "What is music?" Asking "what is law?" has fallen,
I fear, out of fashion. Considering the hazards of abstraction, this
should not be wondered at. Yet, for my present purpose-to establish
some broadly coordinative consensus-a fairly general view is precisely
what we need.
Let me put forward-if only to serve as a common baseline-the
view of law as a language activity.17 That conception is neither as
nebulous nor as unhelpful (nor as pretentious) as it may sound. For
to say that the law is a language is to say more than that the law is
in language. It is to point out that the law is one of several ways we
present the world to ourselves. In common with the other modes of
presentation, the presentation through law involves a process of com-
position and editing.'8 Whatever else understanding the law involves,
it involves an understanding of this process.
17. Of course, there are other ways to view the law-for example, as a means of
distributing wealth and power. To view the law as a language activity, however, is cer-
tainly broad enough to account for a range of competing perspectives, even if it cannot
quite swallow them all. For example, the law may have, as Arthur Leff has emphasized,
large elements of play, Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1005 (1978) ('[The law] is not a
game, [but] it is not not a game, either.'), but to the extent that it is a game, it is a game
through language, a playing with words, as Johan Huizinga so clearly saw. J. HUIZINGA,
Homo LUDENS 83-88 (1955). To expose the law's ludic basis, if it is that, is not to con-
cede that there is nothing we can say about the law in the scholarly metalaw. In fact,
our analysis of "significant" attributes of the law may be better informed by an appre-
ciation of the law's language-ludic qualities: for example, the gaming element may render
adjudication more predictable if it induces the players to strip from legal issues some
of the more serious, and perhaps therefore destabilizing, implications.
18. Nelson Goodman has identified the following processes as going into world-making:
(a) composition and decomposition, achieved largely by reference to the labels through
which we sort reality into classes of relevant kinds; (b) weighting, which relies on dif-
ferences in emphasis or accent, as illustrated in art and music; (c) ordering, such as the
standard ordering of tones by pitch and octave; (d) deletion, which is a result, for ex-
ample, of using a discontinuous scale for measurement (of temperature, say), and sup-
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Let me illustrate with a simple, perhaps trivial, example. Consider
the performance of a piece of music. There are several alternative
frameworks that can be applied to describe or depict various aspects
of the performance. A formalized system of conventional music sym-
bols allows the composition to be transcribed quite literally in terms
of its notes, pitch, rhythms, and so on. There is what we might call
a musical metalanguage, with which we can apply concepts that tran-
scend the aspects of the piece that the notation system aims to cap-
ture-concepts such as harmony, melody, and structure. The language
of physics tells its own story in terms of sound waves, vibrations, and
the density and elasticity of air. Other languages, girded on other
concepts, can express what the composer (or composition) meant.
One could also bring to bear languages of a looser sort, such as paint-
ing and choreography-"looser" because they seem to possess only by
considerable extension of meaning such elements as syntax, grammar,
or vocabulary.
I am suggesting that we look at the law in the same way, as a means
of abstracting from-we could say with equal validity, "putting into"
-the world as it exists (that is, insofar as it may be said to exist inde-
pendent of the law's terms, perhaps in the terms of some other lan-
guage) what we would call the world's law-relevant features. In the
illustration of the musical performance, one of the law's mundane
concerns would be copyright infringement; the law-language therefore
brings to bear-constructs its world view in the terms of-"registra-
tion," "originality, .... access,". "infringement," and so on.
Granted, to say that the law is a language is to call attention only
to some of its most obvious features, namely, those that it shares with
other languages. And it is not yet to say anything about the distinc-
tions between the law-language and other languages-most important,
about the special things we try to do with the law language.19 But
those broad, shared features of language are vital to our understanding
of what law is. Most important is the basic terminology with which
plementation, exemplified by the "phi phenomenon" observed by psychologists; and
(e) deformation, which is used, for example, by the physicist who "smooths out the
simplest rough curve that fits all his data." N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF VORLDMAKiNG 7-17
(1978).
19. I stress the law as a language activity in which the scholar is engaging in Parts
VII-X, pp. 1173-92 infra; in Parts III-VI, I emphasize the world-describing functions
of the legal language, pp. 1157-73 infra. Obviously, the two functions-acting and de-
scribing-cannot always be distinguished satisfactorily, since describing is one of the many
related activities we use language to engage in. See L. WIrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL IN-
VE.TIGATIONs l1-12e (G. Anscombe trans. 1953) (speaking a language is part of an activity
in life in which, in accord with different "language games," we may be describing,
giving orders, cursing, greeting, and so on).
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the law's view of the world is constructed. It is a world in which
people not only walk and punch, they "trespass" and "commit bat-
tery." They are not persons simpliciter, but "buyers" and "sellers."
20
The legal language answers the fundamental questions of jural on-
tology. Who, for example, will populate the judicial world as its first-
class citizens, the bearers of legal rights: men, women, corporations,
minorities as groups, fetuses, states, rivers, 21 trees?22 The language,
too, determines what attributes of the world are to be noticed: mone-
tary value and certain mental states have gained a place, as have pain
and suffering, and consent. Sincerity's place is not so clear.23 Terms
such as "res ipsa loquitor" and "proximate cause" are not just handy
descriptions of what is; they ingrain our worldview with important
presumptions about how the world works.
To know a language obviously involves more than knowing its
terms. The point is underscored in a classic simile of Wittgenstein's,
in which he likens the meaning of a term in a language to a piece
in the game of chess: 'When someone shows someone the king ...
and says: "this is the 'king,' " this does not tell him the use of this
piece ... .,'24 To know what the king is-to know the piece's meaning
-one must know the moves that it can make, what it can do (and
what can be done to it), and with what significance, in the nearly
infinite variety of situations that can arise in the game of chess. So
too, in a language, one does not know the meaning of a term until
one knows the rules of the language that govern its "movement," that
is, how it is correctly applied, what service it may and may not per-
form in various appearances.
20. See Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 LAw & Soc'y Ray. 25, 39-40 (1980)
(analyzing buyer-seller relationship from perspective of legal system's legitimation of
world-view required by capitalism).
21. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (urging
"conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own protection');
Byram River v. Village of Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (suit by river
and other plaintiffs to enjoin village from depositing inadequately treated sewage into
river); cf. Palila (Psittirostra bailleui) v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471
F. Supp. 985, 991-95 (D. Hawaii 1979) (Endangered Species Act suit brought in name
of bird, among others, but court appeared to rely on unfeathered plaintiffs as basis
of standing).
22. For those who care, trees are not having much luck before the bar. See Ezer v.
Fuchsloch, 99 Cal. App. 3d 849, 863-64, 160 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (1979) (refusing to recog-
nize right of tree itself not to be trimmed, notwithstanding modest body of legal
scholarship suggesting such right).
25. Compare Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971) (refusing military draft
exemption to plaintiff who objected to specific war but not on sanctioned religious
grounds; "'sincerity' is a concept that can bear only so much adjudicative weight') with
United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 908-11 (D. Mass. 1969) (allowing exemption
in similar circumstances partly on basis of sincerity of defendant's convictions).
24. L. WirTGENsTEiN, supra note 19, at 15.
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We can carry that image one step further. We know that when we
move a checker piece from a checker board to a backgammon board
we alter the piece's "meaning," though the piece retains the same
physical shape. Likewise, in my musical-performance illustration, cer-
tain symbols that appear in the law-language also appear in other
languages; the judge, like the musicologist, may speak in terms of
"tonal resemblance," "striking similarity," "common trite note se-
quence," and so on.25 But because the same symbol is used as a
''piece" first in one "game" and then in another-with different prizes
hanging in the balance in different games-there is no assurance that
the symbol's applications, the "moves" that can appropriately be made
with it, are the same in both settings.
26
The same distortion of meaning is involved when we introduce
into law terms from, say, psychiatry or economics. Courts get con-
fused and expert witnesses frustrated. While the symbols retain their
shape as they emigrate from one language game to another, they are
being resettled into a different linguistic culture that seems somehow
to imbue, and to alter, their rules of conduct, their mores.
IV
The law comprises, at least, a host of terms-the law's pieces-and
a body of complicated rules that govern their use, their movement
about the law-board (or more correctly, about the law's various
boards).27 But the mastery of these terms, and the acquisition of the
skills for their proper use, are precisely what the routine practice of
law requires. Hence, they are part of what the law school academic
emphasizes as a teacher. The role as scholar implies concern for some-
thing more.
I do not want to get mired in the entire relationship between
theory and practice-how much of the one a student will need in
25. See Kern v. Universal Pictures, 154 F.2d 480, 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1946) (suit for
copyright infringement of musical work dismissed, evidence showing some but not suf-
ficiently striking similarity, considering triteness of note sequence in issue, to compel
inference of access).
26. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (suit for copyright in-
fringement of musical work improperly dismissed on summary judgment; at trial, "[t]he
impression made on the refined ears of musical experts . . . [is] utterly immaterial on
the issue of misappropriation').
27. Even within the law, a given term such as "manufactured product" may have a
different range of application depending on whether its use is in the Tariff Act, Patent
Act, or Interstate Commerce Act. See, e.g., ICC v. Allen E. Kroblin, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
599, 606-07 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (finding history of application of "manufactured product"
in Patent Act and Tariff Act inconclusive regarding application under Interstate Com-
merce Act).
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order to succeed at the other-although it rightly constitutes an im-
portant issue for any branch of university studies that has its roots
in the soil of a trade. Although my colleagues may disagree, I see no
reason to deny that at some point the students' professional needs
and our scholarly curiosities part ways; at that point, wherever it may
be, we begin to measure the marginal returns on our efforts in terms
of advancing an understanding of law, not in terms of training law-
yers. The role we then assume is akin to that of the philosopher of
science, art critic, or musicologist. The interest carries beyond the
current "body" of art, or "body" of law, to a perspective from which
the principles that define the field, and give it coherence and distinc-
tion as a unique medium or worldview, can be understood and per-
haps influenced.28
There is, in law, no agreement on what these field-defining princi-
ples are. I want to persist with the notion that we can most usefully
seek them among features of language. This is not as odd as it may
sound. Law is as much of a language activity as any field we can
imagine. Executors of the various law roles are continuously operat-
ing with words and principles-classifying, applying, distinguishing,
deducing. Granted, most practitioners can learn most of the required
language acts by doing; little more need be understood of funda-
mentals than trained intuition can usually provide. The same is gen-
erally true of practitioners of other arts and crafts. The principles
the painter needs-regarding perspective, light, planes, and so on-
are by and large mastered through practice and experiment.
Scholarship of something-be it philosophy of science or theory of
dance-aims to pass beyond what common sense and intuition can
provide, 29 and to develop insight into relationships the practitioners
themselves may find superfluous or silly. 30 This is ordinarily done by
recourse to some metalanguage, either one specific to the scholarship
28. I do not pursue in this paper, but am frankly intrigued by, other related analogies.
For example, someone might compare the impact law scholars have on the direction of
law with that of art dealers and museum curators on the direction of art, and with
dance impresarios and dance critics on ballet.
29. Examples of such scholarship include N. GOODMAN, LANGUAGES OF ART (1968),
Campbell, The Structure of Theories, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 288
(H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck eds. 1953), and Hempel & Oppenheim, The Logic of Explanation,
in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 319 (H. Feigl & M. Brodbeck eds. 1953).
30. Arthur Koestler reports how, at a lecture he delivered on his theory of creativity
in art, an artist was drawn to protest, "I do not 'bisociate.' I sit down, look at the
model, and paint it." A. Ko.srLER, THE ACT OF CREATION 393 (1964). Our unhappy lot
involves the equivalent of informing ungrateful painters that they "bisociate": informing
dubious jurists that what they really deal in are "debilities" and "no-rights." See p. 1175
infra (discussing "distant dialects" of legal theorists).
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in issue or, more commonly, one that includes concepts borrowed
from other fields.
31
I am suggesting that if we regard the law as a language activity,
and infer the law scholar's role from the relationship of scholars to
their fields generally, one would expect the principal efforts of the
law scholars to involve analyzing the law as one would analyze a
language.3 2 Such an endeavor involves recourse to semantics, language
philosophy, linguistics, psycholinguistics, communications theory, struc-
turalism, and (radiating outwards from the purest language concerns
through everything else that bears on language activity) literary crit-
icism, 3 3 rhetoric,3 4 and so on.
To illustrate in what way a language-based perspective might lend
law scholarship structure and direction, let me borrow from ordinary
language philosophy Freidrich Waismann's suggestion that there are
different language strata.3 5 The notion can be illustrated by reference
to a recurring, if arcane, debate in philosophy: whether, as phenom-
enalists claim, all statements about material objects, such as "there is
a cat on the mat," can, without any loss of meaning, be reduced to
(that is, replaced by) a set of statements about sense data, such ;is
31. Thus, a music theorist may borrow from the language of art and architecture
criticism to clarify his "own" field, see D. CooKE, THE LANGUAGE or Music 2-10 (1959),
and a theorist of comparative creative undertakings may be drawn to a perspective from
which he can discern the commonality of the "languages" of mathematics, art, and music,
see D. HOFSTADTER, G6DEL, ESHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAD (1979).
32. See Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in NOMOS XXII, PROPERTY 351
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1920) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political and
Legal Philosophy) ("[r]ather than begin [writing B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTrTrrION (1977)] a jurisprudential study of property . .. I wanted to ask how
people used property talk. From the start ... I was concerned with the linguistic prac-
tices of a special group of conversationalists-people who, like myself, were trained as
lawyers.")
33. See generally Symposium: Law and Literature, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 603 (1979).
Of particular note is Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some
Common Concerns of an Unlikely Pair, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 676 (1979) (employing models
of literary criticism to clarify assumptions of legal literature regarding statutory inter-
pretation). Further excursions in this direction would probably prove fruitful; perhaps
they could capitalize on such contemporary work in literary criticism as H. BLOOM, P.
DEMAN, J. DERRIDA, G. HARTMAN, & J. MILLER, DECONSTRUcrION & CRITICISM (1979). Pro-
fessor Lipson illustrated the potentials of applying literary criticism's techniques to the
explication of legal texts in his analysis of Judge Cardozo's opinion in Allegheny v.
National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927). Lipson, The Al-
legheny College Case, YALE L. REP., Spring 1977, at 8.
34. See R. FOGELIN, UNDESTANDING ARGUMENTS (1978); C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF
JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT 88-207 (1963) (applying rhetorical analysis to
idea of justice).
35. See Waismann, Language Strata, in Locc AND LANGUAGE 226 (A. Flew ed. 1965)
[hereinafter cited as Waismann, Language Strata]; Waismann, Verifiability, in LOGIC
AND LANGUAGE 124 (A. Flew ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Waismann, Verifiability]. The
affinity with Wittgenstein's "language games," see note 19 supra, is apparent.
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(S1) "over there there is a purring sound," (S2) ". . a blotch of
such and such shape," (S3) "... of such and such a color," and so on.
Waismann proclaimed the unlikelihood of such a reduction:36 sense-
data statements and material-object statements were like movements
on parallel game boards, each with its own rules or, as he variously
put it, different macrological properties, 3 7 distinct "logical styles"38
or "logical textures. '3 9 The same could be said of other broad classes
of statements, such as those of physical laws or of one's own feelings:
they constitute independent language domains, marked by indepen-
dent logical styles.
The notion of "logical style" is, unfortunately, itself inexact. Wais-
mann suggested several related ways in which one might get a grasp
of a stratum's logical style, beginning with examination of the con-
cepts it employs. 40 In mathematics, what one wants to say seems ade-
quately expressible in symbols whose operations are governed by a
complete set of rules (like those for the movements of pieces in chess).
In natural languages, by contrast, the concepts are subject to various
infirmities of meaning-for example, ambiguity, vagueness, and open-
texture41-of which no set of symbols and rules of governance can
fully rid them. The character of the concepts-their precision, for ex-
ample-is integral to the logic of the entire stratum. In scientific lan-
guages, the law of excluded middle holds.42 But languages are con-
ceivable, such as that with which we recount memories, of which we
may not be able to make the same demands. 43 Mathematics has clear
36. Waismann, Verifiability, supra note 35, at 124-27.
37. Waismann suggests that micrological properties are those that deal with "local
relations between propositions"-for example, whether two propositions are inconsistent.
Macrological questions, on the other hand, concern a system as a whole-for example,
.'whether the system under consideration is free from contradiction." Waismann, Lan-
guage Strata, supra note 35, at 234-35.
38. Id. at 235.
39. Id. at 236.
40. Id.
41. A term is vague if it is "actually used in a fluctuating way," that is, if the rules
for its application are indefinite over a broad range of applications. "Warm" and "moun-
tain" are examples. By contrast, a term such as "gold" is not vague in current usage,
because we have rules that enable us to distinguish what is gold from what is not, at
least in reference to all things that we have seen so far. Open texture involves the pos-
sibility that some new substance may be discovered that satisfies all the chemical tests
for gold, but emits a new sort of radiation unique to science, or perhaps is black. Because
such a thing might be found, "it is not possible to define a concept like gold with ab-
solute precision, i.e. in such a way that every nook and cranny is blocked against entry
of doubt." Waismann, Verifiability, supra note 35, at 126; see Waismann, Language
Strata, supra note 35, at 236.
42. Waismann, Language Strata, supra note 35, at 237.
43. Waismann argues as follows: to speak of some memory experience of color, we
are forced either to countenance a highly blurry terminology or else to abandon the
law of excluded middle. Id.
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rules to identify contradictions, which it banishes. 44 In contrast, the
languages of wit and aphorism suffer them gladly.45
Waismann emphasizes, too, that as we pass from stratum to stratum,
we encounter different standards for what makes a statement mean-
ingful. 46 The logical positivists caught part of the truth when they
pronounced, after examining science, that to be meaningful a state-
ment needs the credentials of sensible experience. 47 But they were
too quick to generalize from science about the requirements of mean-
ingfulness elsewhere. In other strata, meaningfulness can turn on
other, less demanding connections with experience. Similarly, as we
pass from stratum to stratum, we encounter different standards of
verification and criteria of truth (or "validity"), different pragmat-
ics.48 In a system of geometry, for instance, the truth of a statement
turns on its coherence with the other statements of the system, indif-
ferent to the shape of the natural world.4'
V
I am not contending that law constitutes a "language stratum" that
is as distinct from ordinary language as, say, the language of mental
events is from the language of physical events, 50 or as that of mathe-
matics is from that of morals. Nonetheless, there are many important
44. See id. at 238.
45. Id. at 241-42.
46. Id.
47. See Carnap, The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Lan-
guage, in LOGICAL POSITiviSM 60 (A. Ayer ed. 1959). Of course, the "positivism" in law
that goes back to Austin is related to the positivism espoused by Ayer and Carnap. See
S. SHUMAN, LEGAL POSITivisM (1963). Ayer's and Carnap's argument in its most extreme
form is that no statement, other than a tautology or contradiction, provides any infor-
mation-augments knowledge, has any meaning-unless we can provide a set of necessary
and sufficient empirical criteria by reference to which it can be either verified or dis-
confirmed. See Ayer, Editor's Introduction, in LOGICAL PosrrvwsM 10-14 (A. Ayer ed. 1959).
48. See Waismann, Language Strata, supra note 35, at 241-42. Pragmatics, as opposed
to semantics, deals with the conditions under which an utterance is appropriate. Moore,
The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 185-86 (1981). The emphasis is im-
portant for an understanding of law viewed as a species of activity; for example, one
declares one's testament, advocates (as a prosecutor) that a defendant be found guilty,
finds (as a judge) the defendant guilty, and so on. See generally J. Aus'rn, How To Do
THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975) (discussing how acts of speech perform various social
functions).
49. Waismann, Language Strata, supra note 35, at 239. Moreover,"... a law of nature
is never true in the same sense in which, say, '[t]here is a fire burning in this room'
is, nor in the sense in which '[he is an amusing fellow' may be; and the two latter
statements are not true in the same sense in which 'I've got a headache' is." Id.
50. Most strikingly, the language of physical events constitutes an ontological com-
mitment to objects in space and time. The language of mental events constitutes a
commitment to events in time, but is, at the least, ambiguous with respect to space:
it would be odd to ask where one's fear or intent is.
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features of the law that make it peculiarly suited to scholarly analysis
from this perspective. There are, to begin with, special constraints
on the character of the concepts the law will allow-restrictions on
vagueness, ambiguity, and open-texture. Then, too, the rules of evi-
dence, pleading, and procedure constitute their own straining mech-
anisms, endowing the law with standards of verification that are in
many ways peculiar to law, and that give law a special cast.51 Evidence
that may be valid to an historian, such as a coerced confession or un-
corroborated testimony, is not allowed in law. The law's "truth," too,
is different: it is inextricably woven with the special thread of things
we are doing in law that we are not doing in mathematics.52 And
while the classic positivists' criterion of meaningfulness is almost cer-
tainly out of place in law,53 it may be profitable to pursue the notion
that the law stratum possesses its own standard of meaningfulness,
that is, of some minimal information content that a statement must
possess in order to be "legally 'meaningful.' ",54
I am not suggesting an inquiry confined within the traditions of
the ordinary-language school, which has now said much of what it
has to say, and perhaps taken a turn toward being merely clever.55
51. Throughout history, the idiosyncracies of law language have provided commen-
tators with many grounds for comment. See J. ALICINSON & P. DREw, ORDER IN COURT
(1979); D. MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 11-23 (1963).
52. The point is that the notion of "truth" cannot be understood apart from the other
elements of the stratum. The statement, "truth, too, is different," might as well be ex-
pressed, "truth, therefore, is different." Perhaps, in law, neither "truth" nor even "va-
lidity" is the word one wants; as Tony Kronman reminds us, lawyers aim to produce
conviction in people with authority. See Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral
Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 963 (1981).
53. "Value-statements," such as moral statements, traditionally have been regarded
as the most tenuously related to sensible experience. Hence, unless the law is prepared
to, and can, purge itself of all value-laden terms, as some, including Holmes, have ad-
vocated, see Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HASv. L. REv. 457, 464 (1897) ("I often
doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be
banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey legal
ideas uncolored by anything outside the law."), the law has to be regarded as an area
whose "meaningfulness" most inadequately comports with positivist criteria. Moreover,
the capacity of positivism to give an adequate account of reasoning even in "value-free"
sciences is in doubt, see W. QuiNE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL
POINT OF ViEw 20 (1961) (criticizing view of logical positivists, note 47 supra).
54. See p. 1190 inIra (discussing problem of nonlegal terms losing or changing mean-
ing as they are brought into law-language).
55. I should remark, in view of my reliance on Waismann's insights, that he himself
had apparent misgivings as to how far he could carry his notion. Language Strata was
originally read in 1946 to the Jowett Society at Oxford, but when Antony Flew asked
him permission to publish it, Waismann, in Flew's words, "found that there was so
much that he wished to alter, and so much else that he wished to develop at con-
siderably greater length." Flew, Introduction, in LocIC AND LANGUAGE 226 (A. Flew ed.
1965). Some effort was required to persuade him to permit its publication in the form
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The idea is to carry the concept of a law-language stratum as far as
it will go, and thereafter to flesh it out with insights from the many
other language-focused fields I have referred to.50 I do not think,
even with those amendments to the endeavour, that we are likely to
emerge with anything like a clear, radically new notion of what law
is, a notion that will change our conceptions at a stroke. Nonetheless,
I am prepared to defend the examination of the law as a "language
stratum" as fit for a baseline mission of legal scholarship, or of one
principal "school," if only for the added understanding that the con-
tinuing effort would provide.
To begin with, the significance of the law's "logical style" over-
whelms almost everything else we do. I have already remarked that
whereas some crafts are handicrafts, the law is intellectual: its prac-
titioners engage in such acts as the application of legal language to
the world and the decomposition of principles of relative generality
("policies" and so on) into principles of narrower scope useful for
the disposition of particular cases. It involves continual explanation
and justification. Justice requires that like cases be treated alike;
analogies have to be sorted into those that fit and those that do not;
metaphors have to be kept within the bounds of judicious constraint.
It is not surprising, therefore, that much of what the law-world
asks its scholars to provide involves commentary on "logical style,"
as distinct from legal substance. There are several problematic dis-
tinctions involved here, which a contrast may clarify. I am assuming
that the reader of an archeology journal, for example, expects to find
reports on new "digs," and that in applied physics journals, the papers
report how some experiment worked out. By contrast, in our own
journals-perhaps aside from reports of some of the social-science-
related activity and the old-style "case developments" sections-most
of the contributions turn inward on legal analysis itself. We pick
apart the "logical" (whatever that means in law) bases of decision;
we analyze "rationality analysis.
' 57
Indeed, whether or not we do so in the language of logical style,
one could maintain that, rightly understood, every major question of
concern to legal scholarship is ingrained with a view (ordinarily un-
specified) of the law's logical character. Consider, for example, the
in which it is published. Flew indicates "that the eventual decision to publish was made
rather against [Waismann's] better judgment." Id.; see F. WAISMANN, How I SEE PHI-
LosopHY 91 n.l (1968) (indicating Waismann was "conscious of exploring new territory"
and dissatisfied with his articles).
56. See p. 1161 supra.
57. See Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L REv. 1 (1980).
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cluster of issues that surrounds separation of powers. We incline to
think of them in what we could call their political-science dimensions
-how do we square a theory of democracy with so powerful a non-
elected judiciary? Yet the questions of political theory-how indepen-
dent do we want our office-holders to be?-are in a sense secondary
to questions of semantics and epistemology: considering the character
of the language that lawmakers must use to communicate their in-
structions to law-enforcers, and of the "facts" that the legal system is
committed to address, how and within what range can we bind the
office-holders to a limited function?5
No one in law scholarship would deny the importance of these
"logical style" questions, once asked. "Thinking like a lawyer" is
part of the vocation's self-image. What is remarkable, in the circum-
stances, is how little we yet have to say about what the logic of the
law, insofar as there is one, is. True, no one can be found today
avowing what the formalists and realists (or rule skeptics) at their
most extreme may have been contending.59 But while the old posi-
tions have lost their champions, what new, generally acceptable views
of the character of legal reasoning and justification have been pro-
vided to take their places?60 Almost everyone seems satisfied to sup-
pose that the truth lies "somewhere in between," and to leave it at
that. Small wonder, then, that the avowedly discarded views continue
to regenerate with new fruit or disguised in new foliage.
One cannot deny that some search for the "in between" continues.
But in several ways, it is an unenthused pursuit. First, few-a rather
isolated few-are doing it today.61 When formalism and realism were
in earnest contention, the debate-whatever, in retrospect, the exag-
gerations and shortcomings-seems to have enlisted a broader, more
visible and mainstream contingent of law scholars.62 Second, almost
all those who are examining the issues of legal logic are doing so in
a way that is in the predominantly secular tradition of "doing juris-
58. See Stone, Towards a Theory of Constitutional Law Casebooks, 41 S. CAL. L. Ray.
1, 7-8 (1968).
59. See Moore, supra note 48, at 155-67 (attempting to sort out possible points of dis-
agreement among various realists and formalists). It is an unflattering commentary on
our literature that even those celebrated positions were left so ill-defined that they
have become identified with their caricatures about slot machines and judges' breakfasts.
60. Arthur Leff has rightly suggested that part of the attraction economics holds
for law professors is the same old yearning for formalism. Leff, supra note 6, at 453-59.
61. The most recent and outstanding exception is Moore, supra note 48.
62. We may attribute the wider interest in jurisprudence among our predecessors in
part to the broadly appreciated political implications of how the judiciary was reacting
to social welfare legislation. Have we simply allowed society-and ourselves-to lose sight
of legal logics continuing implications for contemporary problems?
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prudence." Legal reasoning is certainly-in some ways, and regarded
narrowly enough-special; my suggestion that we pursue the notion
of a distinct law stratum assumes that much. But to study legal rea-
soning outside the context of reasoning (language, meaning, and so
on) generally is to examine the specific without sufficient grounding
in the general-like discussing a species unmindful of the phylum-
and thus to miss what is special about the law.
The skeptic may well ask why, if the case for connecting the law
with language activities in general is so strong, we are not doing more
of it. In part, the line of inquiry I recommend is probably retarded
by a sort of institutional ethos that hangs over the law schools: never
to say anything, if you can't say something solid.63 Whatever may
lie in between formalism and realism is part of the morass that "play-
ing safe" steers away from.
64
There may be the feeling, too, that all this is "old hat," that any
number of traditional commentators on the law, including Hohfeld,
Kelsen, Morris and Felix Cohen, Radin, and Lewellyn have already
said what there is to be said about the law's logical style, if not in
those exact terms. Moreover, those familiar with the literature of,
say, psycholinguistics and the various communications theories, may
rightly wonder how much of it may be useful to us, that we have not
already said, as well, in our own ways.
I can appreciate such misgivings. In my view, however, they mis-
conceive what is marginal because they misjudge the centrality of
the inquiry. We support concerted efforts in law and psychiatry, and
in law and economics, even though their contributors can claim to
illuminate no more than scattered areas of the law (except perhaps
in their very most expansionist moods). By contrast, the language-
related disciplines contribute to an understanding of the law in its
every manifestation; the amount of effort we should be putting into
language analysis has to be measured in that light. Moreover, to claim
63. This gives our work some of its most commendable flavor, but it has its draw-
backs, too. See Waismann, How I See Philosophy, in LOGICAL PosTIvIsM 345, 359-60 (A.
Aver ed. 1959) ("[T]here is nothing like clear thinking to protect one from making dis-
coveries .. . .And some of the greatest discoveries have even emerged from a sort of
primordial fog.')
64. Incidentally, this sort of caution, if endemic to scholarship generally, may be more
prevalent in law. Much of legal scholarship draws on judicial opinion for its raw data
and looks to recognition by the courts as confirmation of worth; the richness of the
literature is destined to suffer from the fact that even modern courts are generally
constrained against too frank a public examination of the logic that they stand on. Con-
aider, for example, the classic "strict constructionist" disclaimer of Justice Roberts in
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936): "the judicial branch . ..has only one duty
-to lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former." Id. at 62.
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that many of the language-related fields do not have much in them
for us is to mistake the nature of the ideal scholarly relationship. Even
if the work of our colleagues in other fields is running as dry as our
own, the implication is not to ignore one another but to be mutually
irrigating-not to ask whether there exists, in "their" work, the an-
swers to "our" questions, but to ask whether greater interchange might
be beneficial to all.
In summary, I doubt that, on close inspection, the legal language
will ultimately turn out to be distinct from most other ordinary lan-
guages with respect to each and every stratum element: syntax, con-
cept texture, rules of transformation, pragmatics, verification, basic
ontological commitments, truth (or validity), and so on. Indeed, if
we look ahead, we can readily anticipate that different areas of law
will turn out to vary, one from the other, with respect to certain
stratum elements. Most obviously, a term employed in the definition
of a crime is subject to severer ambiguity and vagueness constraints
than are terms employed elsewhere. Nonetheless, the mere pursuit
of the notion that there is a law stratum-made jointly with others and
refining our aspirations as we proceed-would lend legal scholarship
a direction and depth now lacking.
VI
One may object that the focus on the law's language is too narrow
to accommodate many of the appropriate concerns of legal scholarship.
The law is not merely a way of describing the world; it is a way of
dealing with it according to certain principles that cannot be palmed
off as mere principles of language. This objection is valid enough so
that in the next section I will introduce a slightly modified perspec-
tive, one that connects legal scholarship with participation in general
social activity. Meanwhile, I want to carry the case for turning in-
ward on language one step further, for I believe the product of such
efforts can account for, clarify, and advance much of what law schol-
arship sets out to do.
Consider the connection between law and morals, which all of us
would agree is one of the fundamental issues for law scholarship. Cer-
tainly medicine, science, technology, and even literature and art gen-
erate and address moral questions. The moral constraints operative
in biology and physics, however, are limited to those placed on any
communal activity: in doing one's job, as in doing anything else, one
has to consider one's effects on others. But no one would say that the
biologist who is splitting genes, or the physicist who is splitting atoms,
is not "doing science." By contrast, it is at least a respectable position
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in legal scholarship to maintain that for an edict to be "a law," or
for a judicial decision to be "lawful," or for a social system to be a
"legal system," it has to possess certain moral qualities and avoid
others. 65 In law, that is, objections to the morality of some actions
may take the form of objections to language usage: not Oust) that
something is "wrong," but that it is "not law."
At its worst, this turn toward English usage can deteriorate into
the most sterile squabble, like an out-of-hand debate about whether
"x is art" or "y is music." Nonetheless, it is a claim worth examining,
even if its ultimate intelligibility is unclear. The contention that
music entails something more than the mathematically possible com-
bination and permutation of notes may not settle a dispute about
whether a John Cage composition is or is not "music." But putting
the question that way may force us to uncover and clarify principles
of music. So too in law. The focus on language principles may lead
us to uncover significant relationships between law and morals: we
may learn not just about the content of norms,66 which is commonly
commented on, but also about principles of logical style, which are
ordinarily slighted.
On the level of logical style, at least three relationships between
law and morals are possible and merit inquiry. The first inquiry
would ask what we can predicate about the law's logical style, in the
terms of ethics. Suppose that the law has its own standards of "truth"
(or validity), its own standards of verification, and its own ontological
commitments deeply embedded in its rules of evidence and pleading,
in the character of acceptable terms, in the practice of cross-examina-
tion and appeal, and in the complex matrix of legal defenses and
justifications. 67 Suppose further that the lens these elements make
65. This is roughly the "internal morality" position suggested in L. FuLLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969) and in Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply
to Professor Hart, 71 HARv. L. REv. 630, 645-46, 660 (1958). Fuller was certainly never
able to define the notion to general satisfaction. See S. SHUMAN, supra note 47, at 88-93;
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 615-21
(1958). Note, however, that the text below involves not substantive principles of legality
of the sort conceived as fundamental by Fuller but elements of logical style, in the
sense I explain just below.
66. By the content of the respective norms, I mean what the rules and principles say
and signify, the subject-matter of traditional jurisprudence and legal sociology. It is
common to observe, for example, that what the legal rules command or permit should
not, and usually do not, wander far from roots in commonly held morals. I am con-
trasting these traditional matters with something more basic if more vague, that is, the
relationship between the logical style of the rules and principles of the legal system,
on one hand, and those of ethics, on the other.
67. See P. SCHUCHMAN, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 17-23 (1979)
(reviewing procedural rules from perspective conscious of epistemological and semantical
implications).
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of the law is not transparent, but that it has its own grind and polish,
its own principles of refraction. Is it not then appropriate to ask of
the law's logical style the same sorts of questions we have customarily
asked of bodies of substantive principle: what can we say of it mor-
ally?6s For example, insofar as the lens determines those aspects of
reality that are expressible in law, is it doing so "justly" (according
to whatever standards of justice one might employ)? Or we could
examine the refractions for their implications for political processes,
for example, along the lines suggested by Jurgen Habermas-that is,
with a view to how the law's logical style contributes to the suppres-
sion, mediation, or elimination of conflicts that are capable of desta-
bilizing society.69
The second inquiry would operate on the assumption that legal
and ethical discourses take place in separate, parallel strata, like two
chess games being played on two boards, one above the other. This
inquiry would presume no systematic connection between the two
strata but would test the hypothesis that, in each, the respective ways
of making and then justifying verdicts involve intellectual activity
of fundamentally the same sort, that they share a common logical
style.7
0
68. I have already adverted to the possibility that the law's special filtering rules may
constrain it to tell its stories in a manner more morally sensitive than do gossip or
history. P. 1164 supra. It may be, too, that at this level-where institutional rules
intersect with dictates of semantics and epistemology-we begin to build our understand-
ing of why and how the law strains out certain "fragile values." See Tribe, Ways Not
to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J.
1315, 1317-22 (1974) (development of environmental law along traditional doctrinal lines
threatens "fragile" values at issue in environmental policy). We may also better com-
prehend why and through what processes the law traditionally seems to favor the in-
tellectual values of expression, association, academic freedom, and so on, over those of
jobs, food, and housing. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRusr 59 (1980).
69. See J. HABERMAS, LEGUIMATION CIusts 95-97, 100-01, 111-17 (T. McCarthy trans.
1975). Habermas contends that "systematically distorted communication" can so warp
a society's process of identifying norms and values through discussion that interests that
would otherwise be asserted as important social goals are "suppressed" or excluded from
a prevailing "world view." An ideal "legitimation system" would be based on a "smoothly
functioning language game" that "rests on a background consensus formed from the
mutual recognition of at least four different types of validity claims . . . that are in-
volved in the exchange of speech acts: claims that the utterance is understandable, that
its propositional content is true, and that the speaker is sincere in uttering it, and
that it is right or appropriate for the speaker to be performing the speech act." Id.
at xii-xiv (translator's introduction). Habermas's analysis suggests that the language of
the law can either facilitate the effective formulation and implementation of "generaliz-
able" values-values would be validated through rational consensus in an ideal "com-
municative community"-or impose a set of normative constraints through "systematically
distorted communication" that represent the values of powerful, dominant groups.
70. Alexander Bickel suggested that the Supreme Court "is the place for principled
judgment, disciplined by the method of reason familiar to the discourse of moral phi-
losophy, and in constitutional adjudication, the place only for that, or else its insulation
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Now, obviously, to claim that law and ethics display a common
logical style is something less than a claim that their reasoning is, in
all respects, "the same." The intellectual process that gives rise to the
law-verdict is hedged and permeated by a set of highly specialized
law-rules, the accounting for which undoubtedly serves to distinguish,
in some degree and at some level, the law's style from that of ethics
(or of history or of any other stratum).7 1
On the other hand, if we put the inevitable distinguishing marks
aside, there are striking similarities between the law's style and that
of ethics, similarities that we have largely disregarded in the effort
to identify ourselves with the more solid model of the physical sci-
ences. Consider, for illustration, two verdicts, the first of law, the
second of ethics: "Jones's copying Davis's work was criminal 'infringe-
ment' "; "Jones's copying Davis's work was 'wrongful.'" This is not
the occasion to carry out the comparisons in full detail, but we should
observe that in both cases, some of the most critical steps in the judg-
ment process occur well before the introduction of formal rules. In
both strata, the process begins with shaping the world "as it is" into
a composition that shows, almost from the start, the stamp of the
stratum's interests and needs-that Jones was "an adult," "of sound
mind," and so on. In both strata, it is difficult to draw a line between
where neutral observation statements-a "mere preparation" for judg-
ment, if there is such-drop off, and where evaluation of the act be-
gins. Moreover, in both cases the epistemological footing of the de-
scription is comparably uncertain and complex, and too critical for
serious scholarship to dismiss as unanalyzably "intuitive."7 2 It is be-
cause of these common elements that we have more to learn about
from the political process is inexplicable." A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
or PRoGREss 87 (1978 ed.). Notwithstanding the considerable significance he thereby at-
tached to "the method" of moral philosophy, he did not proceed to elaborate. See id.
71. As Llewellyn observed, much of judging's logical style turns upon the assumption
that there is a "single right answer." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION 26
(1960). Of course, there is not a single right answer. But the commitment to come up
with a single right answer reverberates throughout the stratum, just as, in science, there
is not a single cause or explanation for an observed phenomenon, but nonetheless the
commitment to find the cause pervades the character of scientific study.
72. Of course, the importance of intuition, particularly as it relates to judicial decision-
making, is not one that our predecessors missed. See Hutcheson, The Judgment In-
tuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278
(1929) (in complicated cases, judge waits for "intuitive flash of understanding"); Oliphant,
A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 75 (1928) (human intuition dominant motive
in judicial decisionmaking). But the goal should be to press our understanding of in-
tuition beyond the merely intuitive; we should be seeking to learn more about the un-
derlying dynamics of our intuition in terms of neural dispositions, cultural determinism
in communication, the uses of paradigms and metaphors in reasoning, and whatever
other models can help us.
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legal reasoning by looking to the literature of formal ethics than we
do by clinging to that of science and syllogism, at least at the present
margin of our knowledge.73
The third inquiry would test the hypothesis that not only are ethics
and law two strata wrought of common internal style, but that there
are connections between them that prevent one from giving an ac-
count of the one stratum without some accounting of the other.74
We know, for example, that the two strata share many terms in com-
mon: "malice," "person," "willful," "agent," "harm." The meanings
of these terms-the things and actions they denote-seem to change,
depending on the stratum in which they are used.75 When, for ex-
ample, a term from one stratum is replicated in the other, are there
principles of deformation that enable *us to understand how the term's
meaning bends ai it passes out of one stratum and into another,
somewhat the way Snell's law enables us to understand the bending
of light as it passes from air into water?70
This task is not easy. The logical styles of ethics and aesthetics are
themselves so imperfectly understood (perhaps so imperfectly under-
standable) that there is no ready-made model of ethical or aesthetic
reasoning available to which the legal scholar can analogize and from
which he can borrow, as the formalist hoped to do with mathematics
73. For example, R.M. Hare analyzed logical discourse by reference to notions of
"universalizability" and "prescriptiveness." See R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 4-5, 186-
202 (1963). Hare, in fact, attempted to ground ethical argument in syllogistic, scientific
methodology, id. at 87-88, 91-93, and it may well be that scientific, syllogistic reasoning
carries further in ethics than is commonly acknowledged, see H. AIKEN, REASON AND
CONDUCt 97 (1962) ("ordinary deductive methods . . . apply, not merely to the factual
parts of an argument to a moral conclusion, but also to the distinctively normative
aspects" even if some part of the reasoning process is noncognitive in a scientific way);
N. MACCORMiCK, LEGAL REASONING 19-52 (1978) (exemplary analysis of role of deductive
justification in law).
74. The more we identify common features of two strata, of course, the less mean-
ingfully we can maintain that we are discussing two strata rather than one.
75. This is not an uncontroversial thesis. It is possible to maintain, as Richard
Epstein strongly implies, that basic terms in tort theory, such as "invasion" and "cause,"
are in fact determined by their meaning in paradigms of ordinary language usage. See
Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 49, 53 (1979) (legal "invasion" a description of natural state of affairs); cf. Borgo,
Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL SruD. 419 (1979) (critical review of Epstein's
use of causal paradigm). As explained in the text, I am dubious that the rules governing
any such terms-their meanings-would evolve in precisely the same way, indifferent to
their placement in or out of law. This is not, however, to deny the plausibility of main-
taining that the ordinary usage does or should, at least presumptively, constrain the legal
usage of various terms.
76. It is not merely the bending of concepts with which we are concerned but that
of whole moral principles as well. One wants to know, for example, how the character
of law-language-the rules for verification, the obligations of clarity, the special prag-
matics-distort a principle like "love thy neighbor" when it is transposed from morals
into the resolution of a legal dispute.
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and the sciences.77 But the mutuality of our ignorance and the alli-
ance of our interests should be incentive for a joint effort of scholars
from law, ethics, and aesthetics, 78 as well as from literary criticism,
psychology, medicine, psycholinguistics, mathematics, and other fields,
to search out what is common, and what distinct, in how we reach
and justify our respective decisions.
VII
The emphasis I have placed thus far may depict a mission too con-
finingly "academic," too detached from social growth and turmoil.
Legal scholars are more than theorists of law; we are active agents in
it as well. To clarify the place of legal scholarship in the context of
law and society, it may serve to borrow a model from another disci-
pline with obvious parallels in its linkages of abstract theory and
practical application: the world of mathematics.
The world of mathematics has been visualized as consisting of a
central sphere, a core, at the center of many concentric layers.79 In
this model, the central core is conceived as the domain of "pure"
mathematics, which includes number theory, mathematical logic, dif-
ferential topology-whatever is most abstract and arcane. As one moves
outward from the core through the regions of the surrounding layers,
the focus of interest shifts away from the most purely theoretical-
from subjects most disregardful of matter and human affairs-and
toward regions where the interest, increasingly, is in applying the
theories to the solution of practical problems.
Ideas from the core percolate through the outer layers . . . pro-
viding a constant supply of intellectual fuel for some of the in-
credibly complex problems of the more applied fields. And, in
77. There is, however, a relevant literature of ethical-aesthetic reasoning, including
H. AIKEN, supra note 73; P. EDwARDs, THE LOGIC OF MORL DISCOUaSE (1955); N. GOODMAN,
supra note 37; R. HARE, supra note 73; and S. TOULMIN, AN EXAMINATION OF THE PLACE
OF REASON IN ETics (1961).
78. A close examination of law and ethics as strata would reveal not only the simi-
larities the one bears to the other but also their common affinity with aesthetics, one
much stronger than law scholars generally have been prepared to recognize. Compare
the intellectual act that underlies the verdict that "Jones's copying of Davis's work
was 'criminal'" with those beneath the verdicts that it was "wrongful" or "well-execut-
ed" or "beautiful." As in law and morals, the basis of the judgment involves a sanc-
tioned description-"deft" brushwork or "subtle" shading-and appeal to some "rule" that
enjoys currency or authority in art. See Isenberg, Critical Communication, 58 PHILo-
SOPHICAL REv. 330, 330 (1949) (dividing critical process in aesthetics into three parts: a
verdict: "[t]his picture or poem is good-," a reason: "-because it has such-and-such a
quality-," and a norm: "-and any work which has that quality is pro tanto good").
We should certainly pursue the suggested comparisons with judgments in law and ethics.
79. Steen, Mathematics Today, in MATHEMATIcs TODAY 7 (L. Steen ed. 1980).
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return, problems arising in the outer layers-in the diffuse bound-
ary where pure mathematics blends with applied science-provide
the central core with new structures, new methods, and new
concepts.
Core mathematics . . . is nourished both by internal energy,
like a self-sustaining atomic reaction, and by new fuel supplied
by the outer layers that are in closer contact with the surface of
human problems. Layers near the core employ sophisticated
techniques in the service of external objectives. . . . Layers re-
mote from the core employ mathematics more as metaphor than
as theory: applications blend with technique so thoroughly that
a totally different discipline emerges.,'
Transferring this model as best we can to the world of law, 1 the
core is the domain of the most basic stuff of law, its principles of
language, its fundamental particles and logic, its most abstract the-
ories. An immediately contiguous layer (or a part of the core-it
hardly matters) is the province of the most abstract fields with which
the law is in some close way bound: ethics, economics, political sci-
ence, social-choice theory, and so on. Moving outward, one passes
through the layer in which the United States Supreme Court and
other appellate courts operate. Their charge entangles them in real
human controversy, but the controversies reach them as highly ab-
stracted fragments of life; and the appellate courts seem, of all the
law-related institutions, to keep the most sympathetic ear, and voice,
for theory. Beyond them lie, in sequence, the trial courts and ad-
ministrative agencies, the legislatures, 2 the law offices, police patrol
cars.
As we move outward, each layer of law-connected activity through
which we pass is decreasingly occupied with the abstractions and
puzzles that scholarship devises when left to its own, and more with
the concrete problems that life throws up at us whether we have
theories about them or not. As we move outward, each successive
80. Id.
81. Absolutely no one to whom I have offered this model for consideration is satis-
fied that it can be fitted, without considerable modification, to suit our own con-
ceptual needs in relating legal scholarship to law. Someone claims that to account for
one thing or another in the law-world, I need to introduce what sounds like a mobius
strip. Someone else wants me to abandon the whole mathematics model and, if I am
going to persist in employing some interdisciplinary filch, to reach into biology for a
living cell (which works in its own way rather nicely). It is not as important for scholar-
ship that we all agree on a single model-I doubt that we could or should-as that we
recognize the value of devising some such images with the capacity to provide an over-
view of our functions.
82. In placing the legislatures further from the core than courts, my assumption is
that, although the courts may not be unmindful of election returns, the legislatures
are, by a degree at least, more influenced by the practical necessities along the edges,
and less by the theories of the core.
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level carries on much of its business, ordinarily, without bothering
to derive and legitimate the basic premises with which it operates;
that is the job of someone else, closer to the center. The computer
designer takes what the number theorist gives him; the construction
engineer accepts the computer on faith.
Some of the most important work in the core is "internally fueled";
that is, it turns inward on itself, indifferent to signals for help or
the availability of new material that may be emanating from the
outermost layers. Moreover, a considerable portion of the activity at
the core is carried on with relative indifference to any use that ac-
tivities in the outer layers may make of it. Some of the activity at
the core may even be considered, broadly speaking, "play."813 Indeed,
some of the language spoken in the core may sound to those living
in the outlying regions, even to the judges and legislators, like a
distant dialect: Hohfeld's table of jural opposites and correlatives,
Radin's "no-demand rights," Koucerek's "debilities," the terminol-
ogy of Laswell's and MacDougall's policy science analysis, the Coase
Theorem, "externalities," and "Pareto-optimality." These are elements
of another language, of a speech not in law, but of it.84
The use to which those in the outer layers put the work of the
core is often incidental to the core's laborers. As in the physical sci-
ences, an idea may abide in the core for years before someone on the
outside finds out about it and appreciates that it has some use, that
it can help build a better mousetrap. And those in the core, preoccu-
pied with their own language and function, may leave unspecified
their connection with the layers.85
83. See J. HUIZINCA, supra note 17, at 4 (expounding view that "the great archetypal
activities of human society are all permeated with play from the start'). And, of course,
the "schools," see p. 1154 supra, receive some of their animation from play-like qualities.
84. At least three, sometimes four, languages of interest to us are at play: first, the
language of a symposium such as this, which takes as its object law scholarship, and
applies to those activities whatever terms may be appropriate-for example, that its product
is "fun to read," "irrelevant," or, as I maintain, "drifting"; second, the language of
scholarship, which predicates of its object, the legal system, that it is "efficient," that
it is "just," and so on; third, the language of the law-players themselves, which may take
as its object the world, in its own special way, see pp. 1156-58 sukra, or may even take
as its object another language, as does the law of defamation, which passes a judgment
on (the fourth possible language) a statement that A made to B about C. As I indicate
below, p. 1186 infra, we do not consistently keep the layers segregated, so that a
statement in the law's metalanguage (the second level) may be employed in some func.
tions in the operating level (the third level), but may be disallowed in other operating
level functions. Thus, a metalanguage statement may be used in reasoning to a decision-
one operating level function-but not in justifying a decision, another operating level
function. See Lipson, supra note 20 (examining the independence of various language levels
in an opinion by Judge Cardozo).
85. Consider, for example, the literature of law and economics, which often appears
ambivalent about what it purports to provide: a theory of legislation, an explanation of
how individual judges decide, a prescription of how they ought to decide, an alternative
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Even when some of the core custodians do undertake to become
consciously involved with the rest of the system-and let me emphasize
that almost all of us at some time or another do-the function is not
(as the imagery may suggest) as simple or as flattering as to serve up
new ideas for the surrounding layers to bat at.8 6 Many ideas that
come to influence law come not from its center, but from beyond
its outer reaches: they originate in folksongs, on the stage, in peri-
odicals. Many other of the law's inventions take place in the courts,
legislatures, and law offices, where they have the advantages not only
of necessity's mothering, but of clients' and lobbyists' bankrolling as
well. And the buffering and resistance is such that many ideas, and
indeed many social problems, never penetrate the core in recogniz-
able form.
7
Indeed, in many respects, the core may appear to outsiders as a
sort of margin, and we, its custodians, as marginal people. We mop
up. Consider, to illustrate, a happening in a layer that is of fabulous
interest to the core: the Supreme Court decides. In the core, scholars
swarm about the reports of it. They find gaps or dissonance. To
some extent, the core hopes thereby to exercise influence outward.
But the concern is as much inward, with how the Court's decision
can be fitted into prevailing scholarly views of the law, with what
it tells us about the adequacy of our own constructs and what we
must do to revise them.
88
way of describing the legal system's implications (however those doing it would describe
their own actions). The point is that for many of those who are absorbed in the problems
of the core, spelling out the connections between their problems and those of the layers
(the reaching out) is simply not a major concern.
86. In his unpublished farewell to the Yale Law faculty, Arthur Corbin observed that
the most important part in the evolution of our legal system is played by the judges.
. . . The work of professors is a necessary work, and may be increasing in its im-
portance. We are the midwives who start the infant lawyer and jurist on his way.
We are the gadflies that sting judges into better action. We are, of necessity, the
generalizers, and the critics of the generalizations that judges make to justify their
decisions. But the judges make decisions. The professors make none.
A. Corbin, Farewell to the Yale Law Faculty (n.d.) (unpublished address, Yale Law
School) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
87. We might do well to contrast our current agenda-what law scholars are predom-
inantly writing about today-with a list, independently established, of what we would
rank as the most important items on a social agenda. My guess is that many high-ranking
social items, including peace, inflation, poverty, and natural resources (energy and water)
are considered only at the periphery of currently prestigious scholarship.
88. Yet, even in being concerned primarily with tidying up their own conceptions,
scholars may contribute to helping the legal system's actors "understand" what they
have said and done. For example, it is quite plausible that in a considerable number
of decisions, judges intuit the correct answer without benefit of theory. The task of de-
vising the "correct" theory ex post may be relegated to scholarship-where the courts,
if interested, can thereafter turn to find it, along, perhaps, with implications that they
could not originally have foreseen. One may well debate the appropriateness of courts
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Yet the whole system interconnects. In each region (core and lay-
ers), new needs and new possibilities evolve, sometimes by a sort of
intellectual or institutional parthenogenesis, but more often under
the pressure, or on account, of something that is taking or took place
somewhere else. Take, as an example, the issue of a job discrimina-
tion against women. We might locate the first complaints in feminist
consciousness-raising groups-a "distant" layer. The complaints work
their way "inward." Periodicals pick up the theme. People appear on
television. In these early stages, the claims are apt to be met with
the sorts of jokes and smirky skepticism that are the inevitable symp-
toms of social growing pains. Gradually public debate spreads and
acquires a more serious tone. Sometime during this period someone
figures out a way to fit the grievances, as they are being expressed in
ordinary language, into some accepted legal rubric-"equal protection
is being violated"-so there can be a lawsuit, complete with judicial
legitimation and pronouncements. Or before it all comes to a consti-
tutional head, there may have been enough of a stir that new rules
are implemented. As a consequence of the new decisions and rules,
reinforced by the new, and more pervasive, levels of awareness, more
women enter the workplace, and more advance to positions of higher
status. The result is a new social environment, in which new levels
of complaining lead to new conflicts-for example, sexual harassment
of women on the job.89 New debate begins, accompanied by new
smirks, new skepticisms, but eventually new social soul-searching and
a new level of law or regulation.9"
Much of the adjustment this process requires-the absorption,
growth, and repair-can be handled by the various layers without
scholarly intercession. The scholarly contribution would seem to be
most important when, in the course of the evolution, the adjustments
that seem called for put pressure on the law's basic concepts, prin-
ciples, theories, perhaps even mode of reasoning. The pressures may
plunging ahead of their abilities to justify themselves, see Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) (criticizing Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), as creating, wholly without justified basis, a "fundamental" right
to abortion), but to assess the objection requires a firmer sense than we now have of
the "logical status" of intuition, see pp. 1171-72 supra.
89. See Bundy v. Jackson, Civ. No. 79-1693, slip op. at 11-19 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 1981),
summarized in 49 U.S.L.W. 2453 (Jan. 20, 1981) (female employee has rights under Title
VII against sexual harassment that constitutes "discriminatory environment," even if
harassment does not threaten tangible job benefits).
90. But if we sought to locate the real beginning, we could not maintain with con-
fidence that the notion was born in the consciousness-raising group; it is equally likely
that the group had taken its cue, perhaps unaware, from something that had occurred
previously in an inner law layer, or even in the core-agitation on behalf of homosexuals,
or trees, for examples.
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turn up inadequacies that are fundamentally social: the existing law
system is not plastic enough to satisfy prevalent feelings about what
the social order should look like or do. Or the inadequacies may be
largely intellectual, when the law's arrangements, while working ade-
quately to meet the world's demands on it, cannot be fitted to meet
the contemporary scholarly framework. Old familiar concepts are can-
didates for withdrawal: separate but equal goes; rehabilitation comes
under assault. Some concepts are simply disemboweled: the malice in
"malice," once required in earnest, comes to be, we say, "presumed."
To meet the demands for a more discriminating environment, con-
cepts begin a process of splitting, as cells do. In the ninth century, the
notion of wrongful acts, theretofore largely undifferentiated with
respect to mental states, bifurcates into willfully wrongful and acci-
dentally wrongful;9 1 accidental proceeds to split into careless and
faultless; careless into reckless and negligent; willful spawns inten-
tional, which, in turn, subdivides into purposeful and knowing. Some-
times existing concepts need, not replacement, but the assistance of
new, mediate concepts to extend their reach to new areas or to aim
them more precisely: suspect classification is introduced under equal
protection, privacy under due process of law.
It is when we move into this area, with its husbandry of fundamental
concepts, that the contributions of law scholarship, although hardly
the unique source of the law's growth, are looked to most respect-
fully. This is particularly true when the courts themselves appear
drifting or stumped and when the law has not yet matured to a
point where the needed development can be achieved through the
ordinary client-driven system.
Note that throughout these efforts of the scholar in law, the at-
tention remains based in the law's language, just as when the scholar's
contributions stress commentary on law. The difference is that there
is more emphasis here on interaction with nonscholars and more
conscious concern with the furtherance of social growth through law.
The balance shifts from the law-language as a special description, a
medium within our expertise, to that of the law-language as a special
activity in which we are engaged. The office, even in these engaged-
activity efforts, is not one of power to effect changes in the world.
Nor, however, is it one of being a mere steward of the legal language,
although there is some of that in it: keeping affairs under eye, review-
91. See Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 815, 821-25 (1980). A particularly interesting aspect of Robinson's paper is his attention
to the lag between the recognition of a conceptual distinction and its authorized imple-
mentation. Id. at 822, 851-52.
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ing when and where new concepts have to be invented, the "wrong
sort" kept out, others borrowed, rearranged, abandoned, fostered,
stocked, preserved from rude assault. We might conceive of the legal
scholar's job as a sort of editorial function. That is, if we can regard
the law as an editing of the world, then the scholar's attentions are
to issues of editorial policy. There are the questions of what is and
what is not fit for expression in the law as a medium, what stories to
go after, what sources to rely on, what words one will print, what
standards of logic and style to uphold. It is in these affairs that schol-
arship exercises its largest influence.
VIII
In a recent essay on the murder of John Lennon,92 Meg Greenfield
observed that the luminaries of the 1960s (with whom, including
Lennon, she could summon little sense of identity) "tended to obliter-
ate the distinction between the personal and the public, to politicize
their own most private experiences and feelings, to see their own
emotional condition as a social issue in itself."93 This reaction can,
I think, be used to illustrate the place of law scholarship for which
I am contending.
No one should think that his or her emotional condition is a social
issue "in itself." To be acted on as a social issue, one's feelings need,
at the very least, to be translated into the terms in which social and
political agendas are framed. On the other hand, making the appro-
priate translations, like composing songs, is a special and complicated
skill that not everyone has. Moreover, the accepted frameworks for
social and political agendas are themselves not beyond some amend-
ing in a direction to meet the feelings half-way or somewhere in
between. To suggest this is not to "obliterate" the line between the
personal and the public. But it is to mark the obvious fact that that
line can and probably ought to shift as feelings and various social
relationships evolve 94 and, indeed, as theoretical insights (emanating,
if you will, from the core) enable us to conceive old feelings and
relationships in new ways. The question is, by what processes is this
92. Greenfield, Thinking About John Lennon, Nawswzc, Dec. 29, 1980, at 68.
93. Id.
94. Some of the significant changes in social relationships are undoubtedly traceable to
new levels of technological, economic, and military strengths and threats, which bring
with them shifts in our capabilities to trust and to tolerate. Other changes may not be
so strongly rooted in identifiable material conditions. See E. DODDS, THE GREEKS AND THE
IRRATIONAL 252-55 (1951) (societies seem to alternate faith in the rational and desire for
freedom with faith in the irrational and need for authority; phases may reflect workings
of cultural-intellectual dialectic not satisfactorily traceable to changed conditions in
material world).
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public-private boundary line to be shifted? Whose responsibilities ex-
tend to doing what?
C. Wright Mills was as severe on England's Angry Young Men of
the 50s as is Greenfield on those of the 60s, on much the same grounds.
They have not made plain-and I don't think they know-the
reasons for their anger. What they have done, and with great skill,
is to specify the mood of personal uneasiness and the quality of
public indifference. They have done so mainly in the direction
of private troubles. But even in that direction they have not suc-
ceeded in converting uneasiness into explicit troubles; I don't
think they can without translating the public malaise and indif-
ference into political issues.95
And, Mills, too, was right. But it may simply be unrealistic to expect
the same people to perform both services at once-to identify the
uneasiness and also to prepare the definitions and translations required
for social action. The first may be the job of the songwriters, social
scientists, playwrights, psychoanalysts, and the people who do soap
operas: theirs is to make clear what the private (and, for that matter,
public) troubles are, each in their own medium. In many ways, they
can probably do a better job indicating what the law should be than
can be done in the law and its literature. One has only to consider
the quality of insight and persuasion that can be achieved by an arti-
cle on the death penalty in a law (or philosophy) journal, as com-
pared with literary treatments such as In Cold Blood or The Execu-
tioner's Song,96 to understand why much of the shaping of the signifi-
cant sentiments, the significant perceptions of power relationships,
and so on, takes place outside the law world. Further, much of the
adjustment that the law-world needs to make in response to these
changing sentiments, it can achieve with only marginal contributions
from us scholars.
I am contending that where the law scholar's skills and traditions
serve most specially, and where scholarly collaboration is most re-
quired, is in establishing what attributes of the world-in particular
what aspects of human character and conflict-should be fitted into
law, and in what manner, and in accordance with what logical style
they should be handled. Of course, the answers continuously change
as civilization evolves. To carry out the refitting that is required,
some editing needs to be done on the attributes in order to accord
95. C. MiLLs, The Complacent Young Men: Reasons for Anger, in PowER, POLITICS
AND PEOPLE 388 (1. Horowitz ed. 1963).
96. T. CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (1965); N. MALEsR, THE EXECUTIONER'S SONG (1979).
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with the worldview's editorial policies, or else the editorial policy
needs to be reformed, or both.
Let me illustrate this, the integrative side of our mission, with ref-
erence to the various "life-style" issues that are now wending their
way toward and into legal recognition. The term, as we know, can
be used to include a broad range of claims that touch the coming
into life,97 the going out of life,98 and many of people's preferences
for what goes on in between.
Let us agree that there have always been people who wanted to live
their lives as they have wanted to, and others who have wanted to
restrain them, and that there is a case to be made for each side. In
the legal literature, most of the central themes have been discussed
under the heading of "legislating morality," which has not wanted
for distinguished contributors. It is thus tempting to dismiss some of
the stir over these life-style issues as trendy, and in part, I do.
It may be wise, nonetheless, to listen for something new in it.°9 To
begin wtih, the claims have spread to new fields of law. Traditionally,
the law's involvement with life-style claims (however termed) was
considered almost entirely in the contexts of crimes and, to a lesser
extent, perhaps, of family law and contracts. Today, as a reflection in
some measure of the spread of law in our lives, we find life-style
claims coming up in areas that include zoning, nuisance, welfare law,
federal support programs, evidence, and child custody. Moreover, the
types of claims seeking recognition have multiplied: we see not merely
the traditional ones of consenting sexual acts and gambling contracts,
but of hair length, where alternative families can live, and what one
97. These claims include claims to abortion, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
and claims to birth control services, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(use of contraceptives); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (availability of contra-
ceptives to unmarried as well as to married couples); Carey v. Population Services Intl,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (sales of contraceptives).
98. These claims include the "right to die" and euthanasia. Courts have almost uni-
formly ordered transfusions necessary to maintain the lives of critically ill hospital pa-
tients. See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582-85, 279 A.2d
670, 673-74 (1971) (ordering blood transfusion over patient's religious objection in order
to prevent patient's death); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 1391, 1394-98 (1966) (collecting cases).
In the legislatures, however, the trend may be otherwise. See CAi. HzALTH & SAFErY CoDE
§ 7186 (West Supp. 1981) (Natural Death Act) (invoking patient "autonomy," "dignity,"
and "privacy" in support of statutory scheme recognizing right to have life-sustaining
procedures withheld or withdrawn). Although the courts seem generally unwilling to
recognize a right to die, they are more favorably disposed towards certain decisions for
euthanasia. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976) (individual's
interest in termination of life-support system overcomes state interest in continuation
as degree of bodily invasion by medical equipment increases and as prognosis dims).
99. See L. Tiun, supra note 12, § 15-5, at 899-900 (recognizing unique features of
"life-style" issues).
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can wear to work.100 And even where the claims are, on their surface,
the same old ones, the feelings that back them seem to have shifted
to something more strident, more open, more broadly held. There
is evidence that what people want and expect from the law is ex-
tending beyond the services the law was traditionally called on to
provide. The new claims have less to do with the restraint of state
power, the securing and allocation of wealth, or the guarantees of
franchise. More frequently, people want law to protect their feelings
from their neighbors, to give their ways a measure of legitimation,
even to help the society as a whole work out new standards and
levels of sensitivity.1' 1 It is as though the legal system is finding itself
pressed to devise a new set of "property" and "liability" rules for an
economy of psychic well-being.
10 2
However we view these developments, I think it is clear that the
region toward which the law is being driven is one sketchily mapped
by existing legal language. It is not certain that our reasoning can
reach it. Perhaps the law should not venture there. Who is to say,
if not we?
Ix
Let me pursue an illustration of this mission in some detail, and
carry through some of the language-based connections. In the Karen
Quinlan case, the father of a comatose child sought a court order
100. See id. §§ 15-13, 15-16, at 941-48, 958-65.
101. I am assuming that the reaction of individuals to stimuli is underdetermined by
physiological conditions, and responds to cues provided by social institutions and ethical
norms. For example, court decisions concerning the appropriateness of the death penalty
inevitably touch and affect our feelings about the sanctity of human life, of "dignity,"
and of "personhood." See Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143, 1173-85 (1980) (implications of respect for per-
sons and human dignity underlying death penalty decisions require that death penalty in
any form be declared unconstitutional).
102. Cases marking this path include Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632, 641 n.9 (1974) (school board's concern about school children viewing pregnant teach-
ers and other factors insufficient to justify compulsory maternity leave), and New Rider
v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693, 698 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (Pawnee
Indian children's suit for right to wear hair in traditional braided style fails in face of
school hair code regulation that "bears a rational relationship to state objective . ..
of instilling pride ... and high school spirit and morale'). It is possible, too, that
the forced transfusion cases, supra note 98, involve trading off the feelings of the family
of the patient against the feelings of the hospital staff. See also L. TRIBE, supra note
12, § 15-12, at 940-41 (suggesting similar trade-off in feelings in legislature's decision to
require motorcyclists to wear helmets; legislature's concern is not as much to protect
society from injury accident costs as to shield it from the lifestyle bareheaded motor-
cyclists' suggest).
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authorizing the hospital to discontinue the child's life-support system.
In the press, the father's request was reported in terms that his daugh-
ter be allowed to die "with grace and dignity."'03 In court, the issue
was bent into rubrics of cruel and unusual punishment, free exercise
of religion, and ironically (to say the least) of the moribund child's
"privacy."104
In the law's edit of the world, some such twisting and bending is,
as I have observed, inevitable. The law has its attributes to emphasize;
the other strata (or world-views) have theirs. Our questions involve
the law's editorial policy, and whether it may be refracting the world
into themes that are, in some sense, less than the best ones.
We can see this process of refraction at work by identifying terms
whose currency is on the increase in the society at large, and examin-
ing their paths as they converge toward law.10 5 "Alienation,"'106 "au-
103. See Karen's Precedent, TIME, Apr. 12, 1976, at 50.
104. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976). The court turned aside the
father's claims as guardian on behalf of the daughter based on free exercise and cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 35-38, 355 A.2d at 661-62. It issued the order, however,
opening the way for termination of life-support, "as a valuable incident of her right of
privacy." Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
105. The path sometimes carries to the law's back door. In his concurring opinion
to A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413 (1966), Justice Douglas used an appendix to quote the view that "Cleland
is suggesting that one must be cautious about what is condemned and what is held in
honor.... The world outside the brothel affirms its faith in the dignity of man, but
people are often treated as worthless and unimportant creatures." Id. at 437 (Douglas,
J., concurring). In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a case framed in terms of "probable
cause" for a frisking, Chief Justice Warren employs a footnote to inject a different level
of awareness of what the case was about.
[Frisking] cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor in police-community ten-
sions. This is particularly true in situations where the "stop and frisk" of youths or
minority group members is "motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain
the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating
anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.
Id. at 14 n.ll (quoting L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYR, & D. RoTENBER, DErEcrION OF CRIME
47-48 (1967)).
106. A LEXIS search indicates that "alienation," once associated with transfers of
property, is entering the law in its existential sense across a broad frontier. It represents a
protectable interest of an employee, see Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 969-74,
168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374-78 (1980) (upholding tort complaint alleging acts of employer
causing "anxiety, emotional distress and alienation on the job"), and of the general
public, see People v. Putland, 102 Misc. 2d 517, 527, 423 N.Y.S. 2d 999, 1006 (N.Y.
Duchess County Ct. 1979) (refusing to remove criminal prosecution of juvenile to Family
Court in part because closure of trial in Family Court would create sense of alienation
and anomie in general public). See also Kutska v. Cal. State College, 564 F.2d 108, 111
(3d Cir. 1977) (fee award rules construed to avoid "'exclusion of minorities from effective
participation in the bureaucracy .. .[, which] creates mistrust, alienation, and all too
often hostility toward the entire process of government."' (quoting S. REP. No. 415,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1971)).
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tonomy," °T  "dignity,"108  "personhood" 10 9 will serve to illustrate.
My interest is not in carrying the banner for the introduction of any
of these particular terms into any particular legal context. Rather, I
want to examine what a "case" for adopting such terms should look
like and, in particular, to illustrate the role that legal scholarship
107. Claims couched in terms of "autonomy" have surfaced in a number of areas,
including criminal procedure, see Bittaker v. Enomoto, 587 F.2d 400, 403 (9th Cir. 1978)
(defendant's right to self-representation incident of his "personal autonomy"), mental
health law, see Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1976) (involuntary medi-
cation of patient committed to state psychiatric hospital raises constitutional claims in-
cluding autonomy interest in right to refuse treatment), family law, see Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 397 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("the guarantee of personal
privacy or autonomy secured against unjustifiable governmental interference by the Due
Process Clause 'has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)'") (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)), substantive
criminal law, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1976) (opinion of White, J.) (death
penalty for rape impermissibly disproportionate to crime even though rape is "highly
reprehensible ... in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy
of the female victim"), sexual conduct, see Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 356 (4th Cir.)
(Craven, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976) (married couple did not forfeit
right of personal autonomy to engage in sexual acts simply because third person was
involved), and life-style claims, see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1975) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (holding validating county regulation of police officers' hair length
"fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and per-
sonal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was designed to protect").
108. Dignity has long been accepted as an Eighth Amendment principle. See, e.g.,
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) ("[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man'). More recently, however, "dignity"
values have been perceived in new constellations of constitutional conflicts such as con-
scientious objection, see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 471 & n.5 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (conscientious objection standard should recognize that decision on morality
of particular war is wholly personal and that, as "Pope Paul VI in § 16 of the Pastoral
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World states: 'Deep within his conscience
man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey ....
His dignity lies in observing this law, and by it he will be judged.' "), libel, see Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 414 n.5 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (state law limiting wrong-
ful and unjustified press reports when individual's reputation at stake appropriate be-
cause protecting reputation reflects our basic concept of "essential dignity and worth of
every human being' ") (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)), and voting, see Cousins v. City Council, 466 F.2d 830, 855 n.30 (7th Cir.)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 893 (1972) (assumption in redistricting
cases that groups rather than individuals vote shows "disrespect for the dignity to which
every man is entitled").
109. The concept of personhood has arisen most notably in the abortion cases. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Parks v. Harden, 504 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1974).
But it promises to be far more expansive. See Alma Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225,
1231-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979) (adults adopted as children have
right to have adoption records unsealed and natural parents identified in part because
of "right to 'personhood,"' although privacy interests of natural parents in remaining
anonymous and interest of adoptive family in maintaining "full recognition of a family
unit already in existence," make "good cause" showing for release of information per-
missible). The notion of personhood may also exert considerable influence in search and
seizure cases in which private papers, as opposed to business records, are deemed to be
"so much a part of personhood that they ought to enjoy a superlative privacy." See, e.g.,
Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175, 179 (10th Cir. 1975); VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d
364, 370 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ought to play in shepherding them into (as well as out of) the law.
It should go without saying that, in each context, the threshold
decision is one on the merits: whether the attribute in question is
one worth singling out for special legal attention. If I seem to pass
over that part of the judgment too quickly, it is because I have deemed
the law scholar's contribution to the merits, while important, no more
informing (and perhaps less so) than that of political scientists, so-
ciologists, economists, and many others. This may be viewed as unduly
confining by a profession not notorious for modest aspirations. But
my own impression is that an examination of the world from this
more restricted base is conducive to work of higher quality and utility
than the contributions that come of explorations on grander tether.
How often do we hear discussions of "what is death?" to rival those
of "what is 'death'?" in some particular legal context? And whether
one agrees or not about the realistic quality and utility of these de-
bates, the fact remains that the law scholar's truly special qualifica-
tions are to connect broad social issues with narrower elements of
the legal system, through his or her expertise in the character of the
law language.
We can demonstrate this by supposing that an affirmative decision
has been made, that personhood, say, has been deemed worthy of
special legal recognition and foster.'10 That decision would only set
off a whole train of inquiries. First, what is the function, in the rec-
ognition and foster of a concept, of giving it a name? A poem can
successfully evoke sadness without the express use of the word;"", and
surely the law has in some sense been dealing with the concept of
personhood in cases that did not use the term explicitly. We may
want to graft the concept onto an already accepted term, as we have
appended the right to abortion onto privacy, but only at the risk of
overload.112 Moreover, we can conceive of there being some concepts,
perhaps including personhood and dignity, whose authoritative em-
110. Of course, recognition and foster are not synonymous; some concepts, such as
malice, are given names in law disapprovingly.
11. See N. GOOOMAN, supra note 18, at 12.
112. The overburdening of a legal term, and many other concept.focused problems,
have been best dealt with in what must be deemed one of our more worthwhile "vogues,"
see p. 1154 supra, the considerable recent literature on privacy, see, e.g., Freund, Privacy:
One Concept Or Many, in NoMos XIII, PIvACY 182, 190-98 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman
eds. 1971) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy); Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and
Reputation, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 41-55 (1979); Posner, The Uncertain Protection of
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 173, 197-216; ELY, supra note 96, at
928-33; Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 326 passim (1966); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv.
34. 40-46 (1967).
1185
The Yale Law Journal
bodiment in law, even in rules intended for their foster, could have
a perverse effect and redound to the eventual erosion of associated
values. 113
Much depends on where the term's use is sought and in what role.
A term can be received on limited visa, its travel restricted to the
metalaw language only. There, in association with "efficiency" and
"justice," it may serve solely to shape the way in which scholars re-
view and make recommendations respecting the path of the law. For
those purposes, the constraints on entry would seem to be relatively
undemanding: a term is free to immigrate if anyone cares to sponsor
it.114 The standards become more complicated in several hybrid situ-
ations, such as in the instance of a term ("efficiency" may illustrate)
that is (1) widely accepted as appropriate to the metalaw, (2) inap-
propriate, or at least not yet generally appropriate, for publicly jus-
tifying decisions, but (3) arguably appropriate, nonetheless, in ju-
dicial and administrative reasoning.
In all events, more stringent barriers certainly arise when the terms
seek entry not in metalaw, but in one of the languages of the law
itself.115 Presumably, the proponents of the term's adoption in law
will contend that to name "alienation" or whatever will advance some
particular goal, depending on the rules in which it is to be set.11 At
the least, adoption of the term in the operating level will constitute
direct acknowledgment that some such quality is one of the attributes
that the law will ascribe to the creatures with which it deals, and that
the law is prepared openly to hear and talk and learn about.
Why should anyone object? I want to emphasize how many of the
objections are rooted in implicit claims about language," T claims that
113. For example, the more we take dignity under legal, hence state, guardianship,
the more we risk enlarging the power of the state to a degree that may ultimately
undignify the citizen. And to those supporting freedom of abortion, there is a threat
in too fecund a definition of "personhood." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57
(1973) (if fetus is person, its right to life guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment).
114. Whether other scholars choose to engage the term is another question, but one
likely to turn upon a fairly loose standard, such as "fittingness" with the law's proper
concerns, more than upon the standards that are significant at the operating levels, such
as precision and intersubjective verifiability.
115. To place a term in the law itself ordinarily consists of embodying it expressly in
statutes, authoritative rules, or constitutional amendments. Sometimes, though, a term
enters by being accepted in the principles and policies that, if not quite "in law" the
way legislation is, are openly resorted to both in reasoning and in justification. See
Freund, supra note 112, at 198 ('if it would be misleading to incorporate a right of
privacy into a legal rule, it would be impoverishing to exclude it as the term of a
legal principle').
116. Depending on the rule, the term may be made, for example, a protectable
interest (or disfavored characteristic) or an element of an independent right (or wrong).
117. There are possible objections to the introduction of a term in addition to those
based on its inability to advance legal values or on its semantical or epistemological
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have not been consistently sorted out in the literature or ordinarily
dealt with beyond the reach of common sense. One could, as an ex-
treme, take the position that "alienation" and similar words are mean-
ingless in the positivists' sense, that no statements we can make with
them can be either true or false, because they are not reducible to
a specifiable set of expressions verifiable by sensory experience. 118
But I doubt many of us believe that this particularly narrow standard
of meaningfulness, if it can still hold its ground in the sciences, is
the gate-guarding criterion in law.119
One could make a related objection, not that a term is "meaning-
less" in the technical sense the positivists invoked against metaphysics,
but in the sense of being hollow or transparent. That is, one could
object that all sentences in which its embodiment is currently sought
can be adequately reduced to a set of expressions that avoid it en-
tirely.120 Of course, there is rightful hostility to terms that are mere
surplusage. But it is hard to argue-although some of the Scandinavian
Realists seem to have tried' 21-that any term of significance in law can
be replaced as adequately as, say, "4" can be replaced by "2 + 2".
A term of the sort relevant to law would be introduced, presumably,
with the accompaniment of some rough, intuitive ideas and theories
about how its application might be different from the application of
present terms even if we assume the term is perfectly substitutable
with other terms at the time of its introduction. In such circumstances,
the term is likely to gather about itself over a period of years new
insights and applications that could not have been conceived origi-
infirmities. One might object that the term's credentials in the relevant range of ap-
plication have simply not been properly presented. For example, I understand Professor
Ely's objection to the use of "privacy" in Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113 (1973), not to be
that the term is in some ultimate sense inappropriate to law-the Constitution might be
amended to provide it a place-but that it cannot legitimately be derived by judges
from existing rules, at least not with the implication of permitting abortions. Ely, supra
note 88, at 948-49. Note that this contention depends on assumptions about the law's
"logical style," as does any position on the legitimacy of deriving one term or principle
in law from another.
118. See pp. 1161-63 supra.
119. Cf. note 48 supra (discussing limits to positivists' criterign).
120. One can construe Richard Epstein's position on privacy as something close to
this: those privacy interests with which the law ought to be involved can be adequately
reduced to traditional categories of claim without articulating a new independent pri-
vacy right. Epstein does not deny that traditional categories may leave some meaningful
residue unaccounted for, privacy in "its philosophical sense," which "may be one of the
highest values of a civilization," but he argues that such values can be advanced "only
by individual effort and planning and not solely as of legal right." Epstein, Privacy,
Properly Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. Rxv. 455, 474 (1978).
121. See Ross, Tu-Tu, 70 H~Av. L. REv. 812 (1957) (key terms in law have no mean-
ing and constitute merely handy semantic connection between descriptive and prescriptive
statements).
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nally and that may lead the law along a different path than the law
would have travelled without it.122
Nor is it a final objection to the introduction of a term into or-
dinary languages generally (putting aside for a moment any special
requirements of the legal language, to which I shall turn) that at
the time of the introduction, we lack a complete set of rules that will
distinguish its proper application in every instance. Indeed, a case
can be made that not only the most obviously vague terms, such as
"warm," but even so-called "natural kind words," 123 such as gold,
defy corralling with a completely adequate set of necessary and suf-
ficient criteria because of open texture.
12 4
Thus, although a debate over a term's appropriateness may sound
like an argument about the properties of language in general, it is
likely on closer inspection to reduce to demands peculiar to the law-
stratum. For example, even supposing the positivists' criterion of mean-
ingfulness to be out of place in law, the law stratum may possess its
own standards of meaningfulness. In this light, one might explore
as an objection to Justice Frankfurter's invocation of "shocks the
conscience" as a due process standard 25 not that the term is vague
(which would imply an indeterminate applicability over a conceivable
range of meaning) but that it is substantially devoid of the minimal
information content the legal system requires.
126
122. I have advocated that legal metalanguage adopt the elocution, "trees have rights,"
with some associated refinements in operating level rules, even if, at the time of the
adoption, all the legal relationships we might wish to alter could be altered without
changing the way we speak.
[S]imply speaking that [new] way . . . brings into the legal system a flexibility and
open-endedness that no series of specifically stated legal rules . . . can capture. Part
of the reason is that . . . 'legal terms' . . . carry meaning-vague, but forceful-in
the ordinary language, and the force of these meanings . . . becomes part of the
context against which the 'legal language' of our contemporary 'legal rules' is
interpreted.
Stone, Should Trees Have Standing: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 41 S.
CAL. L. Rxv. 450, 488-89 (1972).
123. That is, words that purport to name the common nouns and qualities into which
we divide the natural world, perhaps partly through intuition. For example, whatever
word we choose, there exist dogs and gold and green in nature. Natural kind words are
distinguished from theoretical words, and words whose meaning is understandable only
by reference to complex human-invented relationships, such as technocracy, title, and tort.
See W. QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONroLoxcAM RELATIVrrY AND OTHER ESSAYS 123 (1969);
Moore, supra note 48, at 202-03.
124. See note 41 supra (describing "open texture").
125. Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165, 172 (1952).
126. I am not prepared to conclude that the terms employed in that opinion, such
as "sense of justice," are in every sense "'meaningless." There may be virtue, however, in
examining legal language against some standard that emphasizes minimal communica-
tion, if doing so thereby encourages scholarship to recognize and draw upon the relevant
body of nonlaw literature. Consider, for example, the post-Rochin line of cases, including
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Other objections could be explored as problems of verification.
Consider, for example, the law's reluctance to deal with sincerity in
the context of the special procedures, standards, and limits of legal
institutions.127 Other rightful misgivings connect with logical texture.
I do not mean by this merely that the rules for a term's use have to
be determinate enough to account for the legal system's demands for
predictability, fairness, impartiality, and so on. We should account
for the fact that the law relies preeminently on words-words in the
taking of testimony, words in the production of records to take up
with written briefs on appeal. The significance of this bent can be
appreciated, and some future work for law scholars indicated, if we
consider that new audiovisual techniques are making it increasingly
possible to bring into court, and even to transmit on appeal, tapes
that capture nuances not so finely capturable in words (including,
let us suppose, nuances of dignity and its opposites): of how a kid-
napped Patty Hearst looked when she attended a bank robbery, of
the atmosphere in a room in which covert government agents arranged
payments to a congressman, of what transpired in a law office during
the closing of a contract. 28 What new legal terms and concepts will
these technologies make possible and require?
It may be that some concepts simply cannot be brought into the
law intact. For example, perhaps we can "gather in" the word "aliena-
tion," but the character of the stratum, including the way pleadings
are made, proof is taken, appeals perfected, and so on, will shear it
Irvine v. People, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (upholding conviction based on microphone planted
in bedroom closet for one month), and Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (up-
holding conviction based on blood sample taken from unconscious defendant). The
confusion and irreconcilability of such cases may stem from failure of the Rochin
opinion to have transmitted to police officers, courts, and others who have to act in
reliance on Supreme Court opinions, information adequate for them to form concep-
tions even of what features of the world are relevant.
Such a failure does not necessarily imply that the opinion was "bad," absent a fuller
normative vision of Court role. In science, a paradigm may be inaugurated on the basis
of inspiration and hunch based on notions of elegance, the details of which others are
to fill in gradually. In art, someone may be persuaded that a new form of painting is
"beautiful," trusting to others to provide reasons why. "Shocks the conscience" is some-
what like proposing a scientific theory before the confirming data is available, or judging
a painting to be beautiful before one can explain why. What sort of limits are there
on the Court, in comparable circumstances, to hold in abeyance an advance in the law
until it can give adequate explanation? A criticism of the Court's opinion demands two
related inquiries, one into language-how terms acquire meaning in law-and the other
into the proper role of the Supreme Court.
127. See note 23 supra (discussing United States v. Gillette, 401 U.S. 457 (1971), and
United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1967)).
128. See Balabanin, Medium v. Tedium: Video Depositions Come of Age, LrTIATION,
Fall 1980, at 25, 25 ("[t]he new generation of jurors who receive their truth from the
tube may prefer video to live testimony"). In one recent case, a court allowed a plaintiff
to take his own deposition at the point of death over defendant's opposition. Id.
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of its intended identity. Or, one might be concerned that if we intro-
duce a term from some other stratum into law, the gravity of its
nonlaw career may affect its legal orbit in erratic and unforeseeable
ways. This concern is probably less acute when the term in question
belongs to a discipline such as economics, if we assume it will there-
fore enter the law more or less disciplined. But the life that terms
such as "alienation," "dignity," and "personhood" enjoy in ordinary
nonlegal discourse is more casual and libertine. Would such terms,
once adopted into legal usage, steadfastly resist the temptation to
make stray and unpredictable borrowings from old comrades?
There is no way to dispose of these concerns abstracted from any
particular decision. And I gladly grant that the language considera-
tions shade off into, and soon merge with, traditional "institutional"
considerations, such as the desirable allocation of adjudicative func-
tions between judge and jury, trial and appellate court, and so on.
One who felt that the courts have a leading role to play in the evo-
lution of social concepts might advocate the adoption by the courts
of terms in a relatively early stage of definition, the courts thereafter
providing themselves as lead forums for fleshing terms out.129 There
are reasons, too, to prefer a term whose meaning will change some-
what, even in somewhat unforeseeable ways, with developments that
take place in the culture.180 And there are conflicting reasons for the
law to grow from within, on its own terms, and, if a new term is re-
quired, even to draw down from a Latinate inventory some item rela-
tively unfreighted with the connotations of familiar usage.
My point here is simply that continuous decisions of this sort de-
termine the law's character and growth, that they need to be informed
by a close familiarity with language and the legal language in all
their complexities, that our understanding of these features could be
improved by more systematic and concentrated "inward" effort, and
that if I were to identify the critical functions that the law scholar,
by familiarity, training, and tradition, is best positioned to provide,
they would center around these matters and their development.
129. See note 118 supra (discussing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
130. Paul Freund made a similar argument in favor of a unitary concept of privacy
in the law:
[The fuzzy contours of a concept provide, despite the metaphor, a cutting and
growing edge. Logical reductionism, or operationalism, which eschews concepts in
favor of discrete statements of the form "if . . . then . . ." sacrifices assimilative
powers. In reducing a concept it reduces too our chances of accommodating new
relations.... The value of a rich and pliable concept of privacy needs no laboring
when our technology is bringing new threats at least as menacing as . . . psy-
chological testing ... [and] electronic surveillance ....
Freund, supra note 112, at 193-94.
1190
Vol. 90: 1149, 1981
Language Perspective
x
I would like to close on this note. The terms on which I have
relied to illustrate the integrating side of the law scholarship mission
-"dignity," "alienation," "personhood," and so on-are terms that
acquired an inertial boost toward law as a consequence of the cultural
movements of the sixties. We are witnessing now the law world's
continuing and in some ways delayed reaction.
In principle, the process analyzed is no different when the concepts
in play cluster not around feelings, but around shifting notions of
blameworthiness, of social merit, or of power and authority. It is
tempting to take a glimpse ahead, to consider what is happening on
the law's horizons that will put sway not merely on the law's rules,
viewed as its molecules, but on its very terms and concepts, which
we have considered as its particles, and even on its logical style, con-
ceived here as the law's "field." I have spoken of what we do from
the perspective largely of reaction to change. What should we look
forward to and prepare for?
It does not take much of an eye to discern some of it. The increas-
ing bureaucratization of society is putting up between individual and
state a cluttering layer of formal bureaucracies: there will be con-
tinuing proliferation of new claims of, for, against, and through or-
ganizations and groups. 131 Second, as long as the per capita pie con-
tinues to shrink (perhaps until the fusion fairy arrives), and the
metaphor of "spaceship earth" continues to wend its way toward the
center of social consciousness, we can anticipate significant rethink-
ing in ethics, as regards, for example, the status of cooperation and
the equities of dividing up spoils.1 32 The implications for law are
displaying themselves already in the language of "welfare rights."
But they will undoubtedly show up in other ways. Can we anticipate
151. See Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
Hiv. L. REv. 1 (1979) (need in increasingly bureaucratized society to reevaluate funda-
mental judicial concepts, perhaps particularly remedies for securing constitutional values);
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE
L.J. 1 (1980) (same, with emphasis on reevaluation of strategies required to ensure cor-
porate law-abidance).
152. See, e.g., P. FRENCH, THE SCOPE OF MoRALrrY 54-58, 115-60 (1979) ("nonobjec-
tivist" account of how and why people should act morally); D. RECAN, UTILrrARANSM
AND COOPERATION (1980) (modification of traditional utilitarian theories with theory of
"co-operative utilitarianism'). The growing literature on intergenerational obligations
can also be viewed as reflecting the same concerns. See, e.g., Delattre, Rights, Respon-
sibilities, and Future Persons, 82 ETHICs 254 (1972) (obligations regarding future genera-
tions distinguished from obligations to future persons); Golding, Obligations to Future
Generations, 56 MONIsT 85 (1972) (obligations owed to further generations based on claim
that future persons are part of our "moral community"); Hubin, Justice and Future
Generations, 6 PHILOSOPHY & Pus. Air. 70 (1976) (nonutilitarian account, employing
"ideal contract model," of duties to future generations).
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the law's participation in the growth and refinement of greed and
sharing attributes: avarice, cupidity, wastefulness, selflessness, and
altruism? There are the many changes the new technologies, such as
those in biology and communications, will require. And ironically,
if the area of alternative-to-law settlements grows, it will look for
guidance to us.
But I can imagine law scholars, in the period ahead, extending our
concern beyond the legal concepts, rules, and principles, beyond all
the things that go into what the law says it is saying, and paying in-
creased attention to those features of its communication that more
ordinarily go unspoken. That is to say, over and beyond the resolv-
ing of disputes, and the firming of expectations, the law and courts
serve as paragons for social temperament. They exemplify how ur-
gently felt needs can be confronted and mollified with the claims of
principle; they legitimate temperance and reflection; they are in-
volved in working out compromises with reality, and in confirming
and questioning sources of authority.
I am supposing that at different stages of social development, there
are, ideally, different balances that can be struck between trust and
threat as instruments of social organization; and that, in the estab-
lishment of what is the right balance for the moment, the law serves
an important function not often enough considered. 33 That service
is in the atmosphere to which the law contributes-of severity, le-
niency, frankness, consideration. In filling that role, the words of the
law seem no less important than what we might call its style and
tone. 34 To adopt the right ones, we need to understand more about
the capacity and limits of the courts to engage in education, if not in
a sort of cultural psychotherapy.185
All these efforts seem expansive, and are. Yet, to determine the
special part that we have to play, as law scholars, they call for added
concentration inward, on languages and logic. The reward is a firmer
sense of what the law is, and what it and we do best.
133. A thoughtful exception is P. NONET & P. SEaZNIcK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRAN-
sriloN 76 (1978) (distinguishing three types, possibly stages, in legal development-re-
pressive, autonomous, and responsive law, which "can be understood as three responses to
the dilemma of integrity and openness.")
134. The footnote in Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
14 n.11 (1969), see note 105 supra, is an example. It takes an issue framed in an accepted
law-stratum way--'probable cause'-and suggests an alternative interpretation for the
police and body politic to consider: that the situation involves not the defendant's rights
and a single arrest, but a pattern of behavior in which the police (themselves victims
of an uncomfortable self-image?) seek to retain authority among minorities.
135. See W. BISHIN &c C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS 394-402 (1972) (suggesting
application of psychotherapeutic model to crystallize and to direct understanding of
Supreme Court's functions in society); Stone, Existential Humanism and the Lau, in
Exmsmrt. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY 151, 169-73 (T. Greening ed. 1971) (same).
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